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Standing Alone: Standing Under The Fair
Housing Act
Michael E. Rosman*
In 1980, one of the leading authorities on housing law noted that the
Supreme Court had been "especially active" in the 1970's in addressing
standing problems in cases with allegations of housing discrimination;'
indeed, he wrote that "standing problems in fair housing cases seem to have
grown out of all proportion to their proper place in this field."2 The Supreme
Court returned to standing a few years later,3 but has since fallen silent and
left the development of standing law in housing cases to the lower courts.
However, a recent decision of the Supreme Court has suggested to some
scholars that the validity of the Court's prior precedents on housing law
standing may be in doubt.4
This article examines some of that development, particularly under the
Fair Housing Act.5  Recent decisions of the circuit courts have produced
some results that many may consider counterintuitive. For example, the
Second Circuit has recently ruled that anyone who reads an advertisement that
violates Section 3604(c) of the Fair Housing Act6 has standing to sue,
* Associate General Counsel, Center for Individual Rights. J.D., 1984, Yale Law
School; B.A., 1981, University of Rochester. I would like to thank Akhil Amar, Gary
Lawson, and Michael Greve for their suggestions (particularly the ones related to this
article). I am nonetheless possessive about my mistakes and errors.
1. Robert G. Schwemm, Standing To Sue In Fair Housing Cases, 41 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 3 (1980).
2. Id.
3. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
4. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, And Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKE L.J. 1141, 1158 n.125 (1993) (the methodology of Lujan v. Defenders of
Wilderness, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) would require opposite result of that reached in
Havens Realty); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders Of Wildlife: Standing As
A Judicially Imposed Limit On Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1179 (1993)
("the results of the Court's prior statutory standing cases are in grave doubt").
5. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, is
commonly referred to as the Fair Housing Act.
6. Section 3604(c) provides that it shall be unlawful:
to make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published any
notice, statement or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an
intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.
1
Rosman: Rosman: Standing Alone
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
irrespective of whether the reader has any interest in housing.! At the same
time, several different circuit courts have held that organizations that spend
money in seeking to uncover illegal discriminatory housing practices have
standing by virtue of that fact alone, creating, in essence, "citizen standing"
without any provision in the statute authorizing such standing.8
In this article, I argue that these decisions result from several causes,
including some questionable readings of leading Supreme Court decisions.
Primarily, however, I believe the courts, including the Supreme Court, have
not focused with any care on interpretative rules for statutes; that is, rules that
identify what statutory language, or other criteria, suggests broad standing and
what statutory language suggests narrow standing. In the last part of this
article, I take a few cautious steps in this direction.
Most academic work on standing has focused on its constitutional status.
Some excellent articles, including a fairly recent and thorough article by
Professor Cass Sunstein, 9 argue that the Supreme Court decisions elevating
standing to a constitutional doctrine are ahistorical, and that the focus in any
standing questions should be whether the substantive law (be it constitutional
or statutory) creates a cause of action for the plaintiff. I take no issue with
this position because, in the context of the Fair Housing Act, there seems little
doubt that the Courts are doing nothing more than trying, at least, to interpret
the statute.'" But once it is decided that an examination of substantive law
(as opposed to ostensibly immutable Article III requirements) is required, the
next step, it seems, is to look for language in the substantive law that will tell
us something about standing. The commentators have not explored this
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1988).
7. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 904 (2d Cir. 1993).
See infra notes 172-189 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Harry Macklowe, 6 F.3d at 905; Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,
895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990). See also infra notes 206-209 and accompanying
text.
9. Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Citizen Suits, "Injuries"And
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Schwemm, supra note 1, at 8, 12-13, 18, and 49 (Supreme Court
has conflated "standing" determination and "merits" determination; "standing" is a
matter of statutory construction and "standing" cases hold essentially that plaintiffs
have a cause of action). Cf Paul A. LeBel, Standing After Havens Realty: A Critique
And An Alternative Framework For Analysis, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1018-19 & n.37
(criticizing holding in Havens Realty v. Coleman that "white tester" did not have
standing on ground that holding was an improper look at the merits).
[Vol. 60
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STANDING UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
question in any depth. This Article suggests that the courts are having
some difficulty doing that as well, and begins to take that next step.
The problem the courts are having, unfortunately, is traceable to the same
constitutional requirements that have vexed cogent analysis under Article III.
Because of the constitutional and prudential structure the Court has used to
analyze standing, the Court has focused upon two questions related to that
structure in interpreting statutes. Did Congress intend to "remove the
prudential barriers"? Did Congress create a "right," the violation of which
constitutes an "injury-in-fact" for Article III purposes? Moreover, the focus
on these odd questions has deflected attention from the question the Court
should be asking, viz., whom did Congress want to enforce the duties imposed
upon the defendant by this statute? In short, the distortions of the constitu-
tional analysis have had ripple effects, such that even if the constitutional
analysis is somehow repaired by the commentators, it is not clear that statutory
analysis will also improve.
Part I of this article reviews the general principles of standing as they
have been enunciated in the last few decades by the Supreme Court. I focus
on several specific problems in the doctrine which are of interest in the
interpretation of statutes generally, and the interpretation of the FHA in
particular. Specifically, I note the Supreme Court holdings that certain
language in statutory standing provisions requires the removal of the so-called
"prudential rules"-and the lower courts' resistance to that instruction and
their application of those rules in spite of it.
Part I then focuses on what I refer to as the "statutory rights gambit," that
is, the ability of Congress to create a "right," the violation of which constitutes
an "injury-in-fact" for purposes of Article III. I suggest that the Supreme
Court has given us two rather different theories of this gambit: one theory
holding that any "real" injury qualifies under Article III regardless of any
congressional assistance and that Congress can make anything it wants ("real"
or otherwise) an "injury"; and the other theory limiting both the injuries that
qualify under Article III without congressional assistance and the ones that
Congress can create by passing a statute. (I also argue that the latter theory
did not come into existence full blown and without precedent in Lujan v.
Defenders).
11. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 182 n.94 ("I will not discuss here the
question how to interpret statutes that are ambiguous on the existence of a private
cause of action"). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REV.
37, 53-61 (comparing the "common law model" and "public law model" for statutory
interpretation when confronted with statutory silence on the question of standing).
Professor Sunstein's focus, though, is on statutes that regulate governmental entities
and suits which purport to remedy an agency's failure to enforce the law. Id. See
discussion infra notes 236-241 and accompanying text.
1995]
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Part II examines the analysis of the "injury" requirement in Ragin v.
Harry Macklowe, 12 and points out that similar statutory language has been
given quite different interpretations in other statutes. Part III examines those
circuit court decisions which have ruled on standing for organizational plain-
tiffs under the Fair Housing Act, and argues that the circuits, unwittingly or
otherwise, have created a "citizens standing" provision in the Fair Housing
Act.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest that both the so-called Article III re-
quirements and the prudential rules identified by the Court are fairly good
standing rules that can be used as a baseline in interpreting statutes. More
particularly, I argue that in an era in which "plain meaning" interpretations of
statutes are in ascendancy, only a clear and unambiguous message from
Congress that those rules are not applicable should lead to their elimination.
I
It is hard to read any significant number of cases or articles about
standing without coming to the conclusion that few hold the internal coherence
of that doctrine in high regard. The Supreme Court itself has declared that
"[g]eneralizations about standing... are largely worthless as such"'3 and that
the various required elements enumerated by the Court are "not susceptible of
precise definition."'4 Commentators have been no more generous. These
criticisms and concerns aside, the Court plainly has set forth what it believes
are the basic elements of standing.
There are two elements in current standing doctrine, the constitutional
and the prudential. The constitutional elements are said to derive from the
"case or controversy" 6 provision of Article III,"7 and the Court has stated
12. 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993).
13. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970) (hereinafter "ADPSO").
14. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
15. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221
(1988) (gathering various quotes from others describing the incoherence of standing);
LeBel, supra note 10, at 1015 (referring to the "Supreme Court's snarled line of
standing decisions"); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment On Allen v.
Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 650 (1985) (not difficult to argue that current law
is dissatisfying); Schwemm, supra note 1, at 4-5 n.16 (collecting authorities and noting
that "[t]he Supreme Court's numerous efforts to clarify the subject in the past decade
... have been notably unsuccessful").
16. E.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974) (citing ADPSO,
397 U.S. at 151).
17. Article III of the United States Constitution provides that "[tihe Judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
[Vol. 60
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that standing is the most important concept in Article III."s There are three
constitutional elements: (1) injury "in fact," i.e., an injury that is concrete,
particularized and, if not already inflicted, imminent; (2) causation, between
the allegedly illegal acts of the defendant and the injury "in fact;" and (3)
redressability of the claimed injury. 9 These are said to be constitutional
minima, required to be present in every case. Prudential rules, on the other
hand, are judge-made rules which the Court has devised to remove cases
which are inconsistent with the limited role of the courts in a democracy.
Although the Court has never claimed to set forth a complete list of these
prudential rules, it frequently mentions three: (1) litigants should not assert the
rights of third parties; (2) litigants should not assert "generalized grievances";
and (3) the injury claimed should be in the "zone of interests" of the statute
or provision in question.20
It would be difficult (and more than a little arrogant) to quickly
summarize the major criticisms of current standing doctrine, but a number of
elements have been stated often enough to outline. First, as a historical
matter, injury "in fact" has not been a requirement of our jurisprudence.2'
Various forms of actions have been long accepted in this country-the qui tam
action, the "informer" action, the "relator" action, and various forms of
writs-which could be brought by an individual citizen who was not damaged
in any way by the acts of the defendant, but who sought nonetheless to bring
those acts to the attention of a court.' These were, say the commentators,
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ... to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to
Controversies between two or more States ......
18. Allen, 468 U.S. at 750.
19. Id. at 751; Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1982).
20. Allen, 468 U.S. at 751; Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-75.
21. See, e.g., Nicol, supra note 4, at 1151 (summarizing various historical
studies); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing And The Privatization Of Public Law, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1432, 1434 n.9 (1988) (noting that the tradition of prerogative writs makes
any argument that modem notions of injury have constitutional status problematic);
Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor Of Standing And The Problem Of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1394-1409 (1988).
22. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 171-72. Whether qui tam actions are still
viable after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife is a matter of debate. The Court
specifically tried to distinguish the situation where "Congress has created a concrete
private interest in the outcome of a suit.., by providing a cash bounty," but the sine
qua non of standing under the decision was an injury, not an interest. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 573. See infra text accompanying notes 147-167. Compare
James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality Of The False Claims Act's Qui Tam
Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701, 703 (1993) (qui tam unconstitutional)
1995]
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the equivalent of the modem "citizen" suit which has been the victim of the
Court's modem standing decisions.
The commentators generally ascribe the beginning of the development of
standing law to the combination of two somewhat inconsistentjudicial themes:
conservative judges using it to uphold the distinction between regulatory
objects and regulatory beneficiaries (and thus upholding traditional common-
law notions of property rights), and judges like Justices Frankfurter and
Brandeis using it to limit the attacks on New Deal legislation and the
delegation of authority to the administrative state (along with similar doctrines
like ripeness and reviewability).' But at its outset, standing doctrine
employed a "legal injury" test, which, more or less, asked whether the interest
claimed by the plaintiff was one protected by the statute or common law
principle in question, or whether the statute intended plaintiff to have
standing.2' In this sense, early "standing" cases were analogous to the
and John G. Roberts, Jr., Article IIILimits On Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219,
1221-22 n.20 (1993) (questioning constitutionality) with Sunstein, supra note 9, at 232-
34 and Pierce, supra note 4, at 1182 (suggesting the use of cash bounties to circum-
vent the broad scope of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife), and with Marshall J. Breger,
Defending Defenders: Remarks On Nichol And Pierce, 42 DuKE L.J. 1202, 1209
(1993) (the interest in the money is the injury).
23. E.g., Winter, supra note 21, at 1455; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 179-86;
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1434-45. It should be noted that Professor Sunstein
apparently revised his organization of the history of standing between the first and
second articles, and neither one is completely satisfactory. For example, in his first
article, Professor Sunstein refers to the development of the private law model of stand-
ing, and asserts that it was "abandoned" in "two basic steps" (viz., the recognition of
statutory interests and the rise of surrogate standing). Sunstein, supra note 21, at
1438-39. But the authorities he mentions indicate that it is too simple to state that
there was a time period of "development" and a time period of "abandonment."
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1438 n.27 & 1439 n.30 (citing The Chicago Junction Case,
264 U.S. 258 (1924) and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940));
see also Sunstein, supra note 9, at 182 nn.94, 96. So, too, Sunstein's later article
refers to the era following the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946
as a separate period of development, but, as he recognizes himself, all the categories
invoked in the APA were "well-established under previous law." Sunstein, supra note
9, at 181. See also Fletcher, supra note 15, at 226 ("Both before and after the
enactment of the [APA], standing determinations were based on an amalgam of
statutory interpretation and common law assumptions").
24. Fletcher, supra, note 15, at 226-27; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1438-39.
Sunstein distinguishes between those suffering "legal wrong" and those adversely
affected by a relevant statute, which Sunstein calls "surrogate standing." Id. at 1439;
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 181-82. Cf Fletcher, supra note 15, at 227. In both cases,
however, it would appear that Congress had implicitly suggested that plaintiffs in that
category should have standing.
[Vol. 60
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analyses of Judges Cardozo and Andrews in Palsgraf5 and the modem cases
considering whether a statute grants a "private right of action."
26
The "legal injury" test was expanded in the post World War II era, until
it was abandoned in ADPSO27 where the Court, depending upon one's
perspective, either adopted or created from whole cloth the injury "in fact"
test.28 The logical correlations of "causation" and "redressability" came
shortly thereafter.29 While the injury "in fact" test was created to further
expand "standing,"3 the commentators argue that it was subsequently
employed by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to resurrect the distinction
between regulatory objects and regulatory beneficiaries and to deny standing
to plaintiffs bringing certain kinds of "public value" litigation."
The critics of modem standing doctrine, for the most part, seem to agree
that the "legal interest" test had more going for it than current doctrine. In
any standing case, they say, the question should really be whether the positive
25. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Compare
Winter, supra note 21, at 1475-78 (suggesting that modem standing law does little
more than stand as a surrogate for proximate cause).
26. Compare Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1440 ("there was in this period a close
association between the existence of an implied cause of action and the existence of
standing") and Sunstein, supra note 9, at 182 (the "principal question [after passage
of the APA] ... was whether the law had conferred a cause of action") with Clarke
v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 401 n.16 (1987) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975)) (suggesting that "private right of action" analysis, where the Court
examines whether the plaintiff is "'one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statue was enacted,"' requires more from would-be plaintiff than modem "zone of
interests" test).
27. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
28. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 166 (describing modem standing law after
ADPSO as "essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent ones at that"); id at
185 ("What was the source of the injury-in-fact test? Did the Supreme Court just make
it up? The answer is basically yes"); id. at 222 ("the real source of current difficulty
is [ADPSO]"); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 37 ("revolutionized the law of standing");
Fletcher, supra note 15, at 229 ("More damage to the intellectual structure.of the law
of standing can be traced to [ADPSO] than to any other single decision") & n.48 (col-
lecting authorities critical of ADPSO).
29. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1452 ("Understood in the abstract and properly
applied, the requirements [of causation and redressability] are natural and entirely
unobjectionable corollaries of the injury-in-fact requirement of [ADPSO]").
30. E.g., Winter, supra note 21, at 1372 n.7; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 185
(continuation of the expansion of the "legal interest" test); Nichol, supra note 4, at
1154; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L.
REv. 1915, 1921 (1986).
31. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 195-97; Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1452;
Nichol, supra note 30, at 1923.
1995]
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law upon which the plaintiff bases his or her claim grants that plaintiff the
right to sue.32 It is not sufficient that the defendant violated the law; it must
also be the case that the plaintiff is someone who has the right to bring a
lawsuit.3 To ascertain this, one should simply examine the substantive law
upon which plaintiffs bring their claims. In this regard, the prudential "zone
of interests" test-which essentially asks the "merits"-like question of
whether the injury suffered by the plaintiff was within the "zone" of injuries
against which Congress (or any other law-creating entity) wanted to
protect-is one that the commentators believe should be deployed more fre-
quently, and with more bite, than it has in the past.34 (In its current form,
32. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 15, at 223 & n.18 (identifying academic and
judicial roots of theory that standing is just a merits-related question); Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 166 n.15 (identifying additional academic authorities supporting that theory);
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 51 ("the question of standing is the same as the question
whether the plaintiff has a cause of action"). Dean Nichol would add the requirement
that an interest must be "capped" by society and 'judicially cognizable" in order to be
sufficient to support standing, but he also believes that legislative enactment should be
sufficient to meet those requirements. Nichol, supra note 30, at 1946-47.
33. Professor Fletcher notes that Louisiana law distinguishes between a "cause
of action," which is defendant's duty, and a "right of action," which is plaintiff's
ability to enforce that duty. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 238.
34. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 183 n.107 (suggesting that the "zone of
interests" test may be a return to the "legal interest" test); Sunstein, supra note 21, at
1445 (zone of interests test was like "legal interest" test in that it "called for a degree
of entanglement between standing and the merits," although it was more liberally
applied than the "legal interests" test); Fletcher, supra note 15, at 234-35 ("zone of
interests" test is really a first look at the merits) and 263-64 (noting possible reha-
bilitation of the "zone of interests" test in Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S.
388 (1987)); Winter, supra note 21, at 1466 n.538 (in ADPSO, the "Court first rejected
the 'legal interest' test because it went to the merits, and then adopted the 'zone-of-
interest' test, which is only a more pragmatic, Realist's version of the same thing").
One of the difficulties with the "zone of interests" test is its origins in the
Administrative Procedure Act, which apparently makes courts more comfortable in
applying it to statutes that give instructions to governmental agencies. See American
Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Detroit Local v. Independent Postal Sys. of Am.,
Inc., 481 F.2d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1973) (zone of interests test "has relevance only where
the action under attack is that of a governmental agency, whereas the present suit is
one between private parties"). Nonetheless, the appeal of a standing test designed to
assess congressional intent has led to consideration of the "zone of interests" test
outside that context. In Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, the Court suggested that
the application of the "zone of interests" test might be narrower-albeit not non-
existent--outside the context of the APA. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 400-01 n.16. Cf
Fletcher, supra note 15, at 258 n.169 (noting the Clarke court's statement that the test
has been used infrequently outside the APA). As the discussion of decisions under
[Vol, 60
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the "zone of interests" test asks only if a particular plaintiff is "arguably"
within the zone of interests that Congress wanted to protect)." The degree
and extent to which the Court is willing to transform the "zone of interests"
test into a significant substantive limit on those who can bring a cause of
action-that is, into something like the "legal injury" test looked back upon
with such nostalgia by the commentators-remains to be seen.36
The critics of modem standing law also seem fairly united in their
conclusion that, whatever role notions of standing might have in suits against
government agents seeking to force them to conduct themselves in accordance
with law, it has absolutely no purpose or role in suits between two private
Title VII suggests (see discussion infra accompanying notes 66-75), the lower courts
have applied the test to statutes governing private conduct, even when the Supreme
Court has instructed them not to.
35. Professor Fletcher has suggested that Clarke tried to, or did, transform the
"arguably within the zone of interests" test into something with more bite. Fletcher,
supra note 15, at 264. Without additional bite, it is unclear whether a "zone of
interests" test would have any affect on standing under the FHA. See Schwemm,
supra note 1, at 19 n.83 (suggesting that it would not).
36. In Professor Sunstein's first article, he noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has
never denied standing for failure to meet the 'arguably within the zone' test."
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1445 n.56. He described it as a "lenient" test. Id. at 1445
("quite lenient"), 1466 n.174. See also Schwemm, supra note 1, at 19 n.83. In his
second article, Professor Sunstein noted the Supreme Court had denied standing on
"zone of interests" grounds for the first time in 1991, and characterized it as a "recent
rebirth in the zone-of-interest test" which might "presag[e] a partial return to the legal
interest test." Sunstein, supra note 9, at 185 n.107 (citing Air Courier Conference of
Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 111 S. Ct. 913 (1991)). See also Sunstein,
supra note 11, at 37 n.2.
1995]
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actors. 7 In such cases, the question of standing should be entirely subsumed
in the question of whether the plaintiff has a cause of action under the statute.
Indeed, in the Fair Housing Act context, a separate "standing" inquiry can
only lead to mischief since if a plaintiff's case is dismissed only on "standing"
grounds, she could presumably pursue the claim in a forum in which Article
III is inapplicable. 8 But if the "standing" decision was really a determina-
tion that the Fair Housing Act does not provide relief for a particular kind of
plaintiff, it is a merits-based decision which should have res judicata effect.39
The attempt by the courts to create a separate "standing" law within a statutory
framework has left the law more than a little confused.
With this in mind, then, I now explore the dilemma of standing in cases
brought pursuant to the Fair Housing Act.
A. Eliminating Prudence
A statute can modify standing principles in two different ways. First, a
law can identify a "right" the violation of which constitutes an injury "in
fact."4 Second, Congress can, in passing a statute, instruct the courts to
37. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1434-35 (in private law, "the issues of
standing, cause of action, and the merits are closely intertwined... At private law,
there is no need for a distinctive set of principles to govern standing"); Schwemm,
supra note 1, at 23 (citing Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972)) (stating that "standing" and "merits" were functional equivalents), 49, 66-67
(all standing questions in housing cases are reduced to matters of statutory
interpretation) and 57 (Gladstone conflates merits and standing); Winter, supra note
21, at 1461 ("[i]n the private rights context, the concept of standing is entirely
unnecessary").
In cases involving suits against representatives of the executive branch of the
federal government, the Supreme Court has said that permitting "citizens" (i.e.,
individuals who have not suffered any injury in fact) to sue violates the "take care"
clause of Article II and principles of separation of powers. Allen, 468 U.S. at 761;
Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2144-45. Whether provisions of the Constitution other than
Article III limit standing in such cases lies beyond the scope of this article. See
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 231 & n.300 (Article II concerns entirely irrelevant, or at
least obviously non-constitutional, in action where the executive is not a party).
38. Schwemm, supra note 1, at 12-13. Article III, of course, is not applicable
in state courts, which are free (unless constrained by a separate state law or policy) to
issue advisory opinions on questions of federal law. Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
39. Schwemm, supra note 1, at 13; Fletcher, supra note 15, at 229 n.46 (standing
determination should determine "whether a plaintiff has a right to judicial relief in any
court, state or federal").
40. See infra text accompanying notes 105-167.
[Vol. 60
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ignore any prudential limitations on standing, and to consider any case brought
by a plaintiff who can meet the Article III minimum requirements. This
subsection identifies this second phenomenon and notes the lower courts'
resistance to it.
The notion that Congress can eliminate "prudential" standing rules has
received remarkably little notice or criticism from the commentators. Included
among the "prudential" rules is the "zone of interests" test, favored among the
commentators (particularly in its stricter applications) because it asks a
question similar to the question involved in the "legal injury" test, viz., did
Congress intend a particular plaintiff or class of plaintiffs to be able to bring
a claim?"' It is rather odd to say that Congress intended to eliminate the
"prudential" tests. With respect to the zone of interests test, this means that
Congress meant to eliminate any inquiry into its own intent as to who should
have standing. Moreover, as discussed below, Congress' intent to ignore its
own intent is apparently gleaned by examining its intent.
1. Trafficante and Gladstone
The Supreme Court first found that Congress had eliminated prudential
barriers to standing in interpreting Section 3610(a)42 of the Fair Housing Act
in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.43 In that case, two
plaintiffs, one black and one white, claimed that the defendants had
discriminated against non-whites on the basis of race in the rental of
apartments, and that they, tenants at the apartment building at which such
discrimination was taking place, had been injured in that (1) they had lost the
41. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1982). At the time, Section 3610(a) provided for
complaints about discriminatory housing practices to be made to the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development and authorized the Secretary to engage in "informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to eliminate the alleged housing
discrimination practice. Section 3610(d) authorized a complainant to commence a
private action if these informal procedures (or any applicable state procedures) were
unsuccessful. In its original form, the Fair Housing Act provided two separate proce-
dures for a private complainant to follow: the complaint-mediation-lawsuit procedure
of Section 3610 and the direct private lawsuit authorized under Section 3612.
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 104 (1979). Under the Fair
Housing Act Amendments of 1988 (Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619), the
complaint procedure of Section 3610 is supplemented by both administrative
proceedings, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612 (West 1995), and private civil actions, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3613 (West 1995). As with the pre-1988 law, a private civil action can be
commenced regardless of whether a complaint was filed with the Secretary. 42
U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)(2) (West 1995).
43. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
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social benefits of living in an integrated community; (2) they had missed
business and professional advantages that would have accrudd if they had lived
with members of minority groups; and (3) they had been stigmatized from
being residents of a "white ghetto."' Relying primarily on the fact that suits
by private persons were the main method of enforcement under the Fair
Housing Act, and the fact that Section 3610 permitted its provisions to be
utilized by any "person aggrieved," a phrase defined as "[a]ny person who
claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice," the Court
concluded that Congress intended to define standing under Section 3610 "'as
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.""'4 In that last-
cited phrase, the Court quoted Hackett v. MecGuire Bros.,46 a case in which
the Third Circuit had held that the standing provisions of Title VII were as
broad as Article III permitted. In Trafficante, the Court went on to quote
various pieces of legislative history from the Fair Housing Act-specifically
broad statements by Senators Javits and Mondale to the effect that the purpose
of the Act was to replace ghettos with integrated living patterns and that
discrimination hurts "'the whole community"' 47 -despite the fact that it
conceded that "[t]he legislative history of the Act is not too helpful."" Since
the plaintiffs in Trafficante had alleged injury "with particularity,"49 the
Court held that they had standing to proceed.
At first glance, the Court in Trafficante appears to be stating that the
"injuries" suffered by the various plaintiffs were, and had always been, injuries
"in fact" for Article III purposes. The only work that the Fair Housing Act
performed, under this view, is to remove the prudential barriers that prohibited
individuals suffering such injuries from suing. This view is tempered,
however, by the cryptic concurring opinion of Justice White. ° Justice White
44. Id. at 206-08.
45. Id. at 208-09.
46. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). See Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (quoting
Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446).
47. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 211. See also id. at 210 ("the proponents of the
legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects of discrimination had
an interest in ensuring fair housing as they too suffered").
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id at 211. The Court specifically mentioned "the loss of important benefits
from interracial associations" as an injury that would be sufficient to meet the
standards of Article III. Id. at 210.
50. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's brief,
one paragraph concurrence was joined by Justices Powell and Blackmun. While
ordinarily we might pay little attention to such concurrences, Justice White's
concurrence was cited several times thereafter by the Court and relied upon in Warth
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claimed that the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs in Trafficante would not
have met Article III requirements without the Fair Housing Act. But since the
FHA gave those authorized to complain to the agency the "right" to sue in
court, the concurring Justices also concluded that they had standing."' In
doing so, they begged a rather significant question, one which has haunted
Article III jurisprudence ever since: Why were the injuries in Trafficante
insufficient under Article III without the FHA?
Since the Court had identified the existence of the injury "in fact"
requirement only a few years before Trafficante, in ADPSO, the precise
meaning of a standing definition extended to Article III limits was not
particularly clear at the time. To some degree, this was rectified in Gladstone,
Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,-2 a case that considered the scope of
standing under what was then Section 3612 of the Fair Housing Act.53 In
Gladstone, the Court laid out both the Article III requirements and various
prudential requirements of standing and noted that Congress had the authority
to remove the latter, but not the former. 4 Since the rule against the assertion
51. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212 (White, J., concurring). Under Justice White's
view, the phrase "persons aggrieved" not only went up to the limits of Article III
"injury" standing, but also went beyondthose limits. Professor Schwemm supports this
view, and suggests that Justice White believed that the Court had the authority to do
so under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment as interpreted in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966). Schwemm, supra note 1, at 18 n.81 and 46-47. See also
Christopher J. Sprigman, Comment, Standing on Firmer Ground: Separation ofPowers
and Deference to Congressional Findings in the Standing Analysis, 59 U. CHi. L. REv.
1645, 1663-66 (1992) (citing analogy to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Commerce Clause, and arguing that Congressional findings of fact should be given
deference with respect to all standing issues, causation and redressability, as well as
injury-in-fact).
Justice White's view of the Fair Housing Act is echoed in the Court's opinion in
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), where the Court, citing the Trafficante
concurrence, held that the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs there-the same depri-
vation of the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community found
sufficient in Trafficante-were insufficient to meet Article III requirements. The Court
viewed the Fair Housing Act as a statute where Congress "had given residents.., an
actionable right to be free from the adverse consequences to them of racially
discriminatory practices directed at and immediately harmful to others." Id, at 513.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-120. The notion that "aggrieved" was intended
by Congress to go beyond "injured" is not exactly intuitive. Indeed, the Fair Housing
Act always (that is, both before and after the 1988 amendments) has defined the word
"aggrieved" in terms of the word "injured." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(i) (West 1995).
52. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1982).
54. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99-100. The Court had first set forth the three-part
"injury-causation-redressability" test in Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973),
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of the rights of third parties and the application of the "zones of interest" test
were identified as prudential barriers,55 it became clear that those tests were
amongst those scuttled by the holding in Trafficante that Congress had
eliminated the prudential barriers in passing the FHA.
The specific question in Gladstone was whether the somewhat differently-
worded provision of Section 3612 also eliminated prudential barriers.5 6 The
Court, relying significantly on the structure of the Fair Housing Act and its
legislative history, concluded that Sections 3610 and 3612 were designed to
provide alternative remedies to the same class of plaintiffs, and thus held that
standing under Section 3612 should be determined without consideration of
prudential barriers.5 7 In ascertaining whether the plaintiffs had alleged an
injury "in fact" sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III, the Court
held that (1) one plaintiff, the Village of Bellwood (in a part of which, it was
alleged, that blacks, but not whites, were shown apartments), had standing
because the alleged racial steering of the defendants could have reduced the
demand for housing within the village, and lowered property prices and the
concomitant tax base;58 and (2) other plaintiffs who lived within the area that
was the object of the alleged racial steering had standing because they had
been deprived, like the plaintiffs in Trafficante upon whose injury the
Gladstone allegations were obviously modeled, of the social and professional
benefits of living in an integrated community.59 These latter plaintiffs were
and had endowed that test with constitutional status in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975). See Winter, supra note 21, at 1470 n.560.
55. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 & n.6. As Professor Schwemm points out, the
Supreme Court in Trafficante never mentioned the "zone of interests" test. Schwemm,
supra note 1, at 18. However, the Ninth Circuit in Trafficante had held that the plain-
tiffs were not "arguably within the zone of interests" to be protected by the Fair
Housing Act. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1162-64 (9th
Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Thus, the Supreme Court reversal in
Trafficante strongly suggested what was later confirmed in Gladstone, i.e., that the
"zone of interests" test was a prudential one that Congress could eliminate.
56. Specifically, then § 3612 provided that the "rights granted by [various
provisions of the Fair Housing Act] may be enforced by civil actions in appropriate
United States district courts." 42 U.S.C.A. § 3612 (West 1977). As noted previously,
supra note 42, § 3612 has been replaced in the current version of the Fair Housing Act
by § 3613, which, in its standing provision (and like the standing provisions of the
alternative administrative procedures of §§ 3610 and 3612), authorizes a private action
on behalf of"any person aggrieved." 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (West 1995). Thus, under the
scheme implemented by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988, the specific
interpretive question posed in Gladstone was eliminated.
57. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 102-09.
58. Id. at 110-11.
59. Id. at 111-14.
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also deemed to have alleged that the value of their homes had gone down, and
the Court held that this allegation as well was sufficient to meet the standing
requirement.'
Much of the key to understanding Fair Housing Act standing lies in
footnote 9 of the Gladstone opinion.6  Because the Court held that
"prudential barriers" had been eliminated, it rejected the defendants' argument
that because the Fair Housing Act granted no "right" to the plaintiffs to have
one's community protected from the evils of segregation, the plaintiffs lacked
standing under Section 3612. Of some importance here is the fact that the
Court seemed to accept the premise of defendants' argument (i.e., that the Fair
Housing Act granted no "right" to interracial associations or a particular value
for homes).62 It was sufficient for the Court that someone's Fair Housing
Act rights were being violated (or that a violation had taken place), and that
plaintiffs suffered some real "injury" as a consequence of that violation.63
Footnote 9, when combined with the "statutory rights gambit" discussed
later,64 demonstrates that the Court distinguishes between two different forms
of congressional modification to the standing rules: viz., the creation of a right
(the violation of which constitutes an injury for purposes of Article III) and
the elimination of the prudential rules. It also, I believe, undercuts the view
espoused in both Justice White's concurrence in Trafficante and Warth v.
Seldin that the Fair Housing Act granted a "right" to be free from the conse-
quences of racial discrimination. If that were so, then the plaintiffs in
Gladstone really did have their own rights violated, and footnote 9 makes very
little sense.65
60. Id. at 115.
61. Id. at 103 n.9. The analysis in footnote 9 appears to remain the predominant
analytic framework for federal housing and employment discrimination claims. E.g.,
Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d
1268, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
62. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 103 n.9 ("That respondents themselves are not granted
substantive rights by § [36]04, however, hardly determines whether they may sue
63. Id. See also Schwemm, supra note 1, at 58 ("Direct victims were those
homeseekers whom the defendants had actually steered, and, according to the Bellwood
opinion, it was their substantive rights under section 3604 that were being enforced
[.. T]he [Gladstone] plaintiffs were permitted to assert these 'rights of others'...
64. See infra notes 105-167 and accompanying text.
65. Footnote 9 also casts doubt upon Professor Fletcher's contention that the
Court has gone from using "third-party standing" in housing cases, as in Barrows v.
Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (white seller of realty had standing to challenge racially
restrictive covenant which precluded him from selling to black buyer), to "first-party
standing" where plaintiffs are deemed to be asserting their own rights. Fletcher, supra
note 15, at 246 (in Trafficante, "the Court was willing to assume that the white
1995]
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2. Title VII And The ADEA
Given the Supreme Court's unambiguous elimination of prudential
barriers in Trafficante and Gladstone, it is somewhat surprising to examine
some of the subsequent decisions of the lower courts interpreting the very
similar standing language of Title VII.' It seems plain that many of the
lower courts like the prudential barriers and are reluctant to give them up.
Because the Court in Trafficante cited the Third Circuit decision of
Hacker v. McGuire Bros., a case involving Title VII, the circuit courts have
repeatedly said that Congress intended standing under Title VII, like the Fair
Housing Act, to extend to all who can meet the Article III requirements.67
Moreover, when faced with a plaintiff alleging a loss of benefits from interra-
cial association, the injury "in fact" specifically identified by the Supreme
Court in Trafficante and one of the ones from Gladstone, courts dutifully have
granted standing.68
resident was asserting his own right to live in an integrated environment"). See also
Schwemm, supra note 1, at 43 (making similar erroneous argument with respect to Ar-
lington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)); Winter, supra note 21,
at 1483 (Court found "'personal,' congressionally created rights" in Trafficante). Foot-
note 9 demonstrates that the Court, at least as a conceptual matter, views plaintiffs
asserting the "neighborhood injury," as in Trafficante and Gladstone, to have a type
of third-party standing similar to that in Barrows.
66. Title VII permits an administrative charge with the EEOC to be filed by "a
person claiming to be aggrieved." 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-5(b) (West 1995). It also
authorizes such an individual to bring a civil suit. 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-5(f)(1) (West
1995) ("a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge
... by the person claiming to be aggrieved"). Compare text accompanying supra note
45, and supra note 56.
67. See, e.g., Stewart v. Hannon, 675 F.2d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A similar
analysis of standing should hold true under Title VII [as the analysis of the Fair
Housing Act in Trafficante]"); EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 482 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("the phrase 'a person claiming to be aggrieved' in § 706 of Title VII must
be construed in the same manner that Trafficante construed the term 'aggrieved person'
in § [36]04 of the Fair Housing Act"); EEOC v. Bailey, 563 F.2d 439, 452 (6th Cir.
1977) ("Trafficante requires us to hold that the definition of 'a person claiming to be
aggrieved' under Title VII includes a white person.., who may have suffered from
the loss of benefits from the lack of association with racial minorities at work");
Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) ("That analysis of the standing
question [in Trafficante] applies with equal force to actions brought under Title VII");
Gray v. Greyhound Lines East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("Congress has
itself determined [in Title VII] that standing should be granted to anyone who satisfies
the constitutional requirements").
68. See, e.g., Stewart, 675 F.2d at 850; Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 483;
Bailey, 563 F.2d at 452-54; Waters, 547 F.2d at 469-70.
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Yet, the lower courts seem reluctant to jettison all of the prudential
barriers. Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has made clear that the
"zone of interests" test is a prudential barrier,69 and not part of the Article III
requirements, the Eighth Circuit has specifically applied," and the Second
Circuit has affirmed," precisely that test in assessing Title VII standing.72
Of equal importance, the courts have ruled as if various prudential barriers
impeded the standing of Title VII plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that
a shareholder cannot bring a derivative suit against the corporation's directors
for the waste of assets caused by a discriminatory hiring policy, although it
would seem that corporate directors that fail to maximize the quality of a
corporation's workforce by pursuing a non-discriminatory policy have injured
69. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,474-75 (1982);
Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100 n.6. A few courts, it should be noted, have recognized that
the "zone of interests" test ought not to be applied to Title VII after Trafficante. See
Gray, 545 F.2d at 175-76; Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 517 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1976).
70. Clayton v. White Hall Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1989)
(standing under Title VII is a two-part standard consisting of injury "in fact" and an
injury within the zone of interests of the statute).
71. Pecorella v. Oak Orchard Community Health Ctr., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 147,
149 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (Male plaintiff who received a higher wage than his female
counterparts, on the condition that he not disclose his higher wage to his co-workers,
was not within the "zone of interests" of Title VII and thus did not have standing),
aff'd, 722 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1983).
72. See also American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees, AFL-CIO
v. Nassau County, 664 F. Supp. 64, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (hereinafter AFSCME v.
Nassau County) (men who were paid less because they held "traditional female jobs"
had no standing because "these injuries and rights do not place them within the Title
VII zone of interests"); Feng v. Sandrik, 636 F. Supp. 77, 82 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (husband
of assistant professor allegedly discriminated against by university, and who made
"broad allegations regarding injuries he has suffered," was outside the "zone of inter-
ests" of Title VII and lacked standing). For some reason, courts have seemed hostile
to Title VII claims by family members of those against whom the discrimination was
directed, although it would seem that such individuals, given the economic structure
of most families, are no doubt "injured" by such discrimination, perhaps even as much
as those who have been deprived ofthe benefits of an integrated neighborhood because
of discrimination to others. See also Mosley v. Clarksville Memorial Hosp., 574 F.
Supp. 224, 234 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (woman did not have standing to sue based upon
discrimination against either her son or daughter). In Mosley, the court stated that
"standing is not granted to vindicate the rights of third parties," id, precisely the sort
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the corporation." Courts have also rejected claims by male employees who
claim that their salary is lower because they are in a "job group" which is
discriminated against because it is predominantly female.74 The obvious re-
joinder that a lower salary is indeed an injury-perhaps even as important as
the loss of benefits from interracial association-has been ignored (or perhaps
worse).75 The lower courts, it seems, like the prudential barriers and are
73. Foust v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 556 F.2d 946, 947 (9th Cir. 1977). The
court's decision in Foust is less than clear. The court held that it is not "tenable to
permit a corporate employer to maintain a Title VII suit against itself," id., although
the suit was also against the corporate directors who implemented the policy. The
Court also said that it was not deciding whether a derivative suit could be maintained
under state law for failure to comply with Title VII, id at 948 n.1, although that
statement seems to refer to the potential harm from having exposed the corporation to
liability, not the actual harm from having failed to hire workers with the best skills.
74. Patee v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 803 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir.
1986); Spaulding v. University of Washington, 740 F.2d 686, 709 (9th Cir. 1984);
AFSCME v. County of Nassau, 664 F. Supp. 64, 66 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). See also Siegel
v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 713 F. Supp. 54, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(Weinstein, J.) ("Men have not been permitted to assert a claim that they themselves
have been victimized inadvertently by sex discrimination against women").
75. In AFSCME, Judge Glasser tried to deal with the anomaly that the loss of
benefits from interracial association constituted a sufficient injury, but that the loss of
money did not. He claimed that "Title VII... focuses on whether the plaintiff suffers
discrimination because of who he is" and that the loss of benefits from interracial asso-
ciation was considered a sufficient injury in certain cases because, in such cases, "those
plaintiffs were white." AFSCME, 664 F. Supp. at 67 (emphasis in original). Since
male plaintiffs losing money because they are trapped with a low-paying female work
group are not losing money because they are male, according to Judge Glasser, they
have no standing.
The factual premise of Judge Glasser's argument-that only white plaintiffs (and
not minority plaintiffs) are injured when the work force is not integrated with minori-
ties-is rather counterintuitive. One would think that the few minorities hired in a
predominantly white workplace would feel the absence of more minorities even more
keenly than whites. In any event, Judge Glasser's legal premise, that a plaintiff must
have experienced some injury related to that plaintiff's sex or race or nationality, is
completely inconsistent with case law. Trafficante involved both a black tenant and
a white tenant, and the Court held that each one's loss of the benefits of interracial
association was sufficient to constitute the necessary injury. See also Gray, 545 F.2d
at 173 (black employees could challenge discriminatory hiring policies given their
allegation that each suffered a "feeling of isolation" in being one of the few hired
blacks); Washington v. City of Evanston, 535 F. Supp. 638, 640 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(allegation that black employee was forced to endure an "adverse job environment" as
a consequence of defendant's discriminatory hiring policies sufficient). Cf EEOC
Dec. No. 71-969, 6193 (CCH) (Dec. 24, 1970) (white employee "aggrieved" by
supervisor's use of racial epithets in referring to blacks). In Gladstone, the Village of
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reluctant to permit a whole slew of cases to proceed where the plaintiffs are
essentially asserting other people's rights.
The courts are not alone. Perhaps the leading treatise on employment
discrimination,76 in listing the three elements of Article III standing, includes
the prudential "zone of interests" test,77 and throughout its brief discussion
on standing, repeatedly refers unquestioningly to cases that applied the "zone
of interests" test.
78
A similar phenomenon can be seen with the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act (the "ADEA"). The ADEA, like the Fair Housing Act and
Title VII, provides that a civil action may be brought by "[a]ny person
aggrieved.
79
Perhaps the most interesting situation is created by an employment policy
which discriminates against everyone over 30 or 35.' ° Under Trafficante, a
36 year old would presumably have standing because (1) the policy violates
the rights of those over 40, who are protected by the ADEA; and (2) the
plaintiff is injured by the policy.8' The cases have ignored the application
of Trafficante and ruled against such plaintiffs.82
Bellwood, an entity which obviously has no race (see Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
2038, 2072-73 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("a school district cannot be
discriminated against on the basis of its race, because a school district has no race"))
was granted standing. Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 115.
76. ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION (1993)
(hereinafter "LARSON & LARSON").
77. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 76, § 49.12(a) at 9B-25.
78. 2 LARSON & LARSON, supra note 76, § 49.12(a).
79. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(1) (West 1985). Although Trafficante would suggest
that any individual deprived of the benefits of "interage associations" would have
standing, I have not read any reported cases to that effect.
80. The ADEA limits its protection against age discrimination to those "at least
40 years of age." 29 U.S.C.A. § 63 1(a) (West Supp. 1993). That is, the ADEA does
not prohibit discrimination based upon age against those under 40. Compare N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 296(3-a)(a) (McKinney 1993) (prohibiting age discrimination against
anyone over 18).
81. One could argue, I suppose, that the discriminatory act is the application of
the policy to those over 40, and that this act does not injure the 36 year old. This
narrower interpretation of the discriminatory act would preclude standing for the 36
year old, and, under Trafficante, the question could be considered close. The analysis
of the courts that have denied standing to such plaintiffs has not relied on such subtle-
ties.
82. See Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1985) (only those over
40 had standing to challenge state hiring policy that precluded hiring individuals over
29 for police officer positions); Crane v. Schneider, 635 F. Supp. 1430, 1434
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (where candidates had to be between 20 and 35 to take written exam
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One case, Allen v. American Home Foods, Inc.,83 did hold that
individuals under 40 can bring a lawsuit when a plant that included many
workers over 40 was closed because of the age of those older workers.
Consistent with their erroneous belief that the employment discrimination
statutes should use a "zone of interests" test in determining standing, the
Larsons have concluded that this case was wrongly decided, arguing that, were
it otherwise, "there would seem to be few limits on who can sue for ADEA
violations, so long as the employer action affects at least someone in the
protected class."' Of course, that was indeed the point of Trafficante and
Gladstone-that so long as someone's rights were violated, anyone injured by
the act which violated those rights could sue.85
B. Defining Injury
The historic validity (or lack thereof) notwithstanding, the first of the
three constitutionally required elements of standing is injury "in fact." The
Court uses words like "distinct," "palpable" and "not abstract" to describe the
required injury, but it concedes that there is no "precise definition" to the term
and that "[i]n many cases standing question can be answered chiefly by
comparing the allegations of the particular complaint to those made in prior
standing cases."86
That is what I intend to do in this section. Before attempting that,
though, I set forth a baseline definition of "injury"-one which the Court
certainly does 'not employ-to use as a basis of comparison: the utilitarian
injury. A utilitarian injury is one which leaves a person worse off than he was
previously, i.e., one which reduces his or her "utility." Simply put, a
utilitarian injury is one which makes an individual feel worse."
for "Deputy Sheriff' and were eliminated from eligibility list at age 36, ADEA
challenge by individual "in his thirties ... is plainly frivolous"). See also Kodish v.
United Airlines, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1245, 1249 (D. Colo. 1979), affd, 628 F.2d 1301
(9th Cir. 1980) (in ruling that there was no private right of action under Federal
Aviation Act for age discrimination, court notes that 32 year old would not have
standing to sue under ADEA based upon policy that discriminated against those over
30). Note that the holdings of these cases suggest that a company could avoid liability
under the ADEA by firing all employees who reach the age of 38, even though that
policy would seem to violate the spirit of the Act.
83. 644 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
84. 3A LARSON & LARSON, supra note 76, § 98.54 at 21-63.
85. E.g., Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg.
Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
86. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751-52 (1984).
87. A simple example of a utilitarian injury is presented by Professor Fletcher
when he suggests that a child whose sibling receives a bicycle from his parents, but
[Vol. 60
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In using Supreme Court decisions to answer certain questions about
standing, I will focus on questions that are particularly relevant to cases under
the Fair Housing Act. First, is mental distress an injury "in fact?" Second,
what types of injury "in fact" are "judicially cognizable," and how can
Congress "define" an injury through the "statutory rights gambit?" In
answering that last question, I will also consider the relatively recent case of
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.88
1. Injury and Mental Distress
At first glance, the answer to the question of whether "mental distress"89
is an appropriate Article III injury is obvious. Intentional infliction of
emotional distress is a fairly well established tort under most states' laws, and
nothing the Supreme Court has ever said has suggested that such claims
cannot be heard in federal court. Indeed, the Court has analogized Fair
Housing Act claims to precisely such torts.'
But the requirement that an injury be "particularized" has led in some
instances to conclude that not every form of mental distress will be recognized
by the Court as a sufficient injury "in fact." Mental distress caused by acts
which have only a remote connection to the plaintiff (and which, thus, could
be asserted by a large number of people) do not meet the "particularity"
who receives nothing himself, is hurt. The complaining child invokes "a sort of
familial equal protection clause." Fletcher, supra note 15, at 231-32. See also
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 189 (describing other kinds of psychic injury); Nichol, supra
note 30, at 1922 (whether a litigant was "harmed by distribution of government
resources to religious schools... depends upon the subjective state of mind of the
litigant"). The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does provide a
claim for individuals who suffer such harms from certain kinds of unequal treatment.
See infra notes 92-93.
88. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
89. I use the phrase "mental distress" here to encompass all forms of
psychological injury, whether denominated as emotional distress, dignity harm,
stigmatic injury or any other term.
90. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195-96 n.10 (1974) ("[a]n action to redress
racial discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or intentional
infliction of mental distress. . . 'under the logic of the common law development of
a law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination may be treated as a dignitary tort"').
See also Schwemm, supra note 1, at 69. Two administrative law judges who hear
housing discrimination claims (pursuant to Sections 3610 and 3612 of the Fair Housing
Act) note that such "intangible" damages are usually much larger than any out-of-
pocket damages. Alan W. Heifetz & Thomas C. Heinz, Separating The Objective, The
Subjective And The Speculative: Assessing Compensatory Damages In Fair Housing
Adjudications, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 3, 9 (1992).
1995]
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requirement of Article III. ' For example, the Court has held that the stigma
attached from being treated unequally is a sufficient injury to meet Article
III.9 But the unequal treatment must be personal. In Allen v. Wright,93 the
Court held that merely being part of a group which is being treated unequally,
without a showing that the individual bringing suit was somehow personally
treated in an unequal way, is not enough.94
91. One of the various prudential requirements identified by the Court is that
litigants should not be heard to assert "generalized grievances more appropriately
addressed in the representative branches[.]" Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751
(1984). As the text suggests, it is not altogether clear how this differs from the
Constitutional requirement of a "particularized" injury. See Blanch, supra note 22, at
711 ("The problem with this distinction between prudential standing and Article III
standing is that is does not seem to exist in practice. In case after case, the Supreme
Court has stated that generalized injuries cannot constitute sufficient injury in fact to
satisfy Article III's essential requirements"); Patti A. Meeks, Justice Scalia And The
Demise OfEnvironmentalLaw Standing, 8 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 343, 364 (1993)
("Scalia has apparently used [Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife] as a stepping stone
towards constitutionalizing the generalized grievance standing limitation"). See also
Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need To Separate
Constitutional And Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1063, 1082 & n.l 14
(1994) (purporting to explain the difference between a "generalized grievance" and one
common to a whole population). I think the cases discussed in this section (see infra
text accompanying notes 93-101) undermine Meeks' theory that the similarity between
the prudential and constitutional requirement is somehow a new phenomenon created
by Justice Scalia.
92. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984) (individual being denied
equal treatment has standing even where congressionally mandated remedy for
inequality will be to take benefits away from those being favored rather than granting
any benefits to plaintiff). Curiously, in Heckler, the Court said that a violation of the
right to equal treatment "can cause serious noneconomic injury to those persons denied
equal treatment solely because of their membership in the disfavored group", id at
729,--as opposed to saying that it did cause (or that plaintiff alleges such)
noneconomic injury.
93. 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the manner in
which the IRS determined if private schools discriminated on the basis of race and thus
should be denied tax-exempt status).
94. But cf Smith v. City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F.2d 720, 722 (6th Cir.
1985) (granting standing to black resident of city that allegedly engaged in steering
practices in order to keep its integration level at proportions that would prevent white
flight; even though resident "was not himself subject to any steering practices when
he purchased his home [two years prior to the implementation of the steering policy]
... he is forced to interact on a daily basis within the Cleveland Heights community
under the weight of this imposed badge of inferiority"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056
(1986). Could Smith have alleged that he was being deprived of the benefits of the
less integrated community that would have resulted had the city not consciously
22
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Similarly, the Supreme Court has not permitted citizens to sue when they
perceive the government acting in an unconstitutional fashion. In Schlesinger
v. Reservists Committed To Stop The War,95 the Court held that citizens
could not sue merely because they believed that the government was violating
the Incompatibility Clause of the Constitution96 by allowing members of
Congress to remain in the armed forces reserves, characterizing it as an
abstract interest.97 In a suit to have the CIA Act declared unconstitutional
because it permitted the CIA to receive funds without providing a detailed
statement of account in violation of the Constitution," the Court held that the
plaintiff's injury as a citizen in being unable to intelligently follow the actions
of his government did not qualify under Article III."9 And in Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United For Separation Of Church And
State,"'0 the Court rejected a challenge by a group of citizens dedicated to
the separation of church and state to the grant of land to a religious-
educational organization, holding that individuals did not have a personal right
to a separationist government or a spiritual stake in the Establishment
Clause.'
No doubt each of the plaintiffs in Schlesinger, Richardson, and Valley
Forge suffered some kind of utilitarian injury. They objected to the
governmental violation of law (as well, no doubt, as the policies those
violations seemed to be implementing), and no doubt probably suffered some
form of mental distress. But impersonal mental distress does not do the trick
under Article III. The Supreme Court, concerned about an avalanche of
lawsuits that might result, has limited standing to those who suffered mental
distress as a consequence of some "personal" treatment.
discriminated to prevent white flight? Could a black nationalist or racist have made
that allegation?
95. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office").
97. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.
98. Article I, § 9, cl. 7 of the Constitution states that "No Money shall be drawn
from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be
published from time to time."
99. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974).
100. 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
101. Id. at 487 n.22. The Court added that an allegation of a violation of the
Establishment Clause does not provide organizations "a special license to roam the
country in search of governmental wrongdoing to reveal their discoveries in federal
court," id. at 487, a notion that seems to have been forgotten in the interpretation of
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One can understand the Court's concern. The "particularity" requirement
is weak enough as it is."02 As Justice O'Connor noted in Allen, a contrary
holding with respect to the stigma of inequality would give standing to
members of the disfavored group in Hawaii to challenge policies in
Maine. 3 But the result is that the measure of whether the injury meets
constitutional standards has very little to do with the injury itself, but rather
with the way the injury was inflicted. My mental distress, after all, may be
just as strong when I see someone else being mistreated as it is when I am
mistreated. The difference between what is and what is not an injury "in fact"
sufficient for Article III purposes must depend on something other than the
injury itself.'
2. The Statutory Rights Gambit
To distinguish between mental distress that the law will recognize as an
injury "in fact," and that which it will not, the Court sometimes uses the term
"cognizable" injury in fact. Thus, in Allen v. Wright, the Court stated that the
"stigmatic" injury suffered by the plaintiffs was not "judicially
cognizable"' 05-an expression that, in that instance, merely referred to the
fact that it was not an injury that met the Article III "particularity"
requirement. But the Court has used the word "cognizable" in another sense
as well, referring to the fact that injuries can become "judicially cognizable"
because a law has been passed which provides for redress for that injury.10 6
This is what I have characterized as the "statutory rights gambit."
102. Indeed, as Professor Winter has noted, it is not altogether easy to
characterize a deprivation of "the benefits of interracial living," which can be claimed
by an entire geographic neighborhood, as a particularized injury. Winter, supra note
21, at 1381. Compare Schwemm, supra note 1, at 20 & n.90 (Senator Javits' remarks
concerning discrimination hurting "the whole community" suggest that everyone in San
Francisco should have had standing to sue based upon the harm in Trafficante). See
also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1972) (injuries included a detriment to
air quality).
103. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984). Compare infra note 188.
104. More generally, a number of different commentators have noticed the diffi-
culties in defining injury "in fact" and conclude that the Court's determinations are not
fact based, but value laden. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 9, at 188-89; Fletcher, supra
note 15, at 231-33.
105. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755.
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The Court has repeatedly said that the injury "in fact" requirement can be
met by the invasion of a legal right created by law."07 Although the Court
seems usually to be referring to a federal statute passed by Congress, the
Court has also indicated that the "legal right" might be created by a judicial
decree"o' or a state statute.109
But in defining a "legal right" the invasion of which can constitute an
injury for Article III purposes, is Congress limited at all? Is the doctrine
needed (or appropriate) only for "injuries" that are not real injuries at all, or
do some "real" (Le., particularized, palpable and not abstract) injuries still
require congressional assistance before they qualify under Article III? And if
certain particularized and concrete "injuries" need congressional assistance
before they become "cognizable," what is it that distinguishes those injuries
from the injuries that need no congressional assistance? In other words, why
are these injuries not Article III injuries to begin with?
As we shall see, the Court has not given consistent answers to these
questions over time. Case law has, in fact, given us two different visions of
the "statutory rights gambit." The first holds that there are some actual (or
"de facto") injuries that do not make the grade as Article III injuries without
statutory assistance, and that need a congressional boost. This vision, in the
version recently revived in Defenders of Wildlife, also limits Congress to de
facto injuries when defining rights."0 The second vision, the one primarily
employed in Fair Housing Act cases, holds that Congress can create any right
it chooses regardless of whether we would consider the invasion of that right
an "injury" in any true sense. Under this vision, if Congress gives us a right
not to see the color purple, we have standing to sue when we see that color
regardless of whether our seeing the color purple has injured us in any
meaningful sense.
107. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (an actual or threatened injury
sufficient to meet Article III standards may exist solely by virtue of "statutes creating
legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing"); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (in the absence of a statute, plaintiff must show an actual
injury); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974); Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
108. Allen, 468 U.S. at 763 (in distinguishing earlier case of Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the court states that the plaintiffs in Norwood had
rights created by a school desegregation decree and were thus "injured" by a violation
of the decree).
109. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 n.17 (1986) (suggesting that the
Illinois legislature could create rights the violation of which might constitute "injury"
for Article III purposes).
110. E.g., Nichol, supra note 4, at 1158 (under Lujan v. Defendersmethodology,
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a. The Early Years
The first vision has roots in Justice White's concurrence in
Trafficante"' and in Warth v. Seldin."' In Warth, the Court rejected a
claim that certain plaintiffs had standing to sue for violations of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"' because they had been
deprived of the benefits of interracial assoeiation14--precisely the kind of
injury upheld in Trafficante. The Court stated that there was no Fair Housing
Act claim involved and therefore the injury caused by the deprivation of the
benefits of interracial association was not a "judicially cognizable injury."115
Warth relied upon Justice White's concurrence in Trafficante for its holding,
specifically citing it for the proposition that "Congress may create a statutory
right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to
sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable
injury in the absence of a statute.""' 6 While this marks the embryonic
development of the statutory rights gambit, it started out its life in a rather
confused state (a state it has never quite outgrown). The Warth Court found
that the Fair Housing Act had granted residents of housing facilities a "right
to be free from the adverse consequences" of discrimination." 7 This sounds
very much like a right to be free from an injury, which seems like a rather
odd definition for a "right." Moreover, it naturally begs the question: what is
the difference between an "adverse consequence" (which to the uninitiated
sounds very much like an injury) and an "injury-in-fact"? If they are the
same, of course, then the creation of a "right" not to be injured serves the
111. 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring). See supra notes 50-51
and accompanying text.
112. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiffs lack standing under equal protection clause
to challenge zoning decisions). Warth is similar to the majority decision in Defenders
of Wildlife (see infra discussion in subsection "c") in that both suggest that there are
actual injuries, like the detriment from living in a racially monotone neighborhood,
which simply do not qualify as Article III injuries without the assistance of a statute.
Justice Scalia's opinion in Defenders goes further and suggests that it is only such "de
facto-but-not-enough-on-their-own" injuries which Congress can protect under the
statutory rights gambit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992).
113. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
114. Warth, 422 U.S. at 512-14.
115. Id.
116. Id The Court had twice before, in dicta, cited Justice White's concurrence
for the proposition that Congress could create a right the invasion of which could
confer standing. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (in the
absence of a statute, plaintiff must show an actual injury); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974).
117. Warth, 422 U.S. at 513.
[Vol. 60
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same purpose as expanding standing to the Article III limits (and casts doubt
upon my suggestion that there are two distinct ways in which Congress can
affect standing)." 8
The underlying supposition of Warth is that there are actual,
particularized injuries which simply do not cut it as Article III injuries-in-fact
without the assistance of a statute. So too, injuries that can be recognized
without a statute are a subset of all possible Article III injuries. (Thus, Justice
White's assertion in Trafficante that the injuries there would not have met
Article III requirements without the existence of the Fair Housing statute).
The injuries that can be recognized by a statute may be real and particular
injuries, just like the injuries in Trafficante, but they need that statutory
assistance to qualify under Article III. The statutory assistance is to create a
"right" not to be injured in ways that the Constitution and/or the common law
do not recognize.
As discussed in somewhat greater detail in the discussion of Lujan, this
vision of the statutory rights gambit runs into several problems (not the least
of which is the case law supporting a different vision). For the moment, one
might note that there is nothing in the reported cases which tells us what
injuries make it as Article III injuries without statutory assistance, and why
they do and others do not."9  Indeed, as far as I am aware, those who
espouse this vision of the statutory rights gambit have never explained this
distinction.
Even more curiously, Warth states that the substantive law involved will
affect the viability of an injury "in fact." Indeed, while insisting that standing
was an issue apart from the merits, the Court specifically held that it will often
turn on the nature and source of the claim asserted"'2 -statements that seem
to conflict with one another and that require us to strain language ("apart from
the merits"?) to make sense of the opinion."'
Consider, for example, a woman denied housing because of her sex in
1967 (one year prior to the passage of the Fair Housing Act)." It seems
118. See infra note 155.
119. Cf Nichol, supra note 30, at 1930 n.100 (noting that Warth made no such
explanation, although that clearly was its holding).
120. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500. As Dean Nichol correctly notes, the "distinct" and
"palpable" aspects of the "interracial association" injury cannot change depending upon
what law is being cited. Nichol, supra note 30, at 1931 n.101.
121. See Schwemm, supra note 1, at 7 ("The inability of the Supreme Court to
distinguish [existence of a cause of action from existence of standing] is one of the
principal sources of confusion in fair housing cases"); Winter, supra note 21, at 1466
& n.528. But cf. Gottlieb, supra note 91, at 1093-94 (difference between Warth and
Trafficante was Court's improper use of separation of powers analysis in Warth).
122. Professor Sunstein uses the example of a "tester" being falsely told that
1995]
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bizarre to say that the woman lacked standing because she had not suffered a
"cognizable" injury;' " our intuition would suggest that she simply lacked a
cause of action. And if the word "cognizable" is intended to mean nothing
more than that the plaintiff has no cause of action, it really makes no sense to
characterize it as a standing issue. That, of course, is precisely the point that
the critics of modem standing doctrine make, Le., that "standing" really is a
question on the merits, and should be treated as such." 4
housing was unavailable (for an impermissibly discriminatory reason) prior to the Fair
Housing Act being passed. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 189-90. I use the example in
the text because it is much less clear to me (as I think it is to others) that the "tester"
has suffered an injury "in fact" either before or after passage of the Fair Housing Act.
E.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.) ("The standing of the testers is, as an original matter, dubious.., they suffer no
harm other than that which they invite in order to make a case against the persons
investigated"). Compare United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 933 (7th Cir.
1992). See infra the discussion in the text accompanying notes 133-135. If one as-
sumes, as Professor Sunstein apparently does, that an actual injury has occurred to the
testers, then his example serves the same purpose as mine.
123. See Sunstein, supra note 9, at 190 n.129 (in discussing Trafficante,
Professor Sunstein asks if it is "even plausible to think that there was no 'injury in
fact' before the statute, and thus that the California plaintiffs came to experience an
injury ('in fact'!) the day that Congress passed a law in the District of Columbia").
124. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 40 ("There can be no law-free inquiry into the
subject of injury"). In International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of
Tulane Educ. Fund, 111 S. Ct. 1700 (1991), the Court seemed to edge closer to adopt-
ing the merits-based view of standing. Citing Professor Fletcher's article, the Court
held that "[s]tanding does not refer to a party's capacity to appear in court. Rather,
standing is gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that
a party presents." Id. at 1704. The Court held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge
the removal of their claim to federal court even though they had no Article III standing
to pursue the substantive claims themselves (relating to the preservation of primates).
Id. It reasoned that plaintiffs were being injured by the removal because they were
being precluded from pursuing their claim in state court. Id. See also United States
Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 402 (1980) (even though plaintiff's
substantive claim was moot, he was still injured by the decision of the court below that
he could not represent a class, under FED. R. CIv. PRo. 23, and thus had standing to
pursue that claim over mootness objections). But cf Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
239 n.18 (1979) ("The Court of Appeals appeared to confuse the question of whether
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b. A Different View Develops
As noted earlier, the Warth vision of the Fair Housing Act as providing
a "right" for those who had suffered "adverse consequences" of discrimination
appears to have been abandoned in footnote 9 of Gladstone.2 ' There, as we
have seen, the Court seems to have rejected the premise that those suffering
from the denial of the benefits of interracial neighborhoods had had their
"rights" violated, and returned to the Trafficante majority theme that all those
"injured" (for Article III purposes) had standing to sue even without a
violation of a "right." But this reversal did not affect the viability of the
statutory rights gambit in general, which continued to be cited.
Indeed, shortly after Gladstone, the Court decided Havens Realty Corp.
v. Coleman,"6 in which a different vision of the statutory rights gambit is
first applied. In Havens Realty, two of the plaintiffs were "testers," i.e.,
individuals "who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment,
pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of
unlawful steering practices."' The complaint alleged that a white tester
was told that certain apartments were available, but that the black tester was
not told of their availability.'28 In considering whether those plaintiffs had
standing, the Court found that in passing Section 3604(d)-which makes it
illegal to make a misrepresentation about the availability of housing "to any
person because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin" 29 "Congress
... conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful information about
available housing." 3 ° Because the black tester alleged that he had received
125. See supra notes 52-65.
126. 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
127. Id. at 373.
128. Id. at 369.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d) (1982). After the 1988 Amendments, which added the
existence of a handicap and familial status as additional impermissible criteria of
discrimination, Section 3604(d) reads as follows:
[I]t shall be unlawful ... [t]o represent to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin that any
dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental when such dwelling
is in fact so available.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(d) (West 1995).
130. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373. Clearly, the Court somewhat overstated
the case in suggesting that Section 3604(d) created a "legal right to truthful
information." Section 3604(d) is not some all-purpose anti-fraud or full disclosure
statute, and it does not require anyone to provide truthful information. It only
precludes people from giving false information (or withholding truthful information)
for an impermissible reason (i.e., because of race, color, sex, and the like). Providing
false information for some other reason (e.g., because it is late and a broker wants to
1995]
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false information because of his race, he was deemed to have standing.13 1
Since the white tester did not allege that he had been given false information,
he did not have standing. 132
A few notes about Havens Realty and the second vision of the statutory
rights gambit are in order. First, the Court did not look for any utilitarian
injury. It did not look for any "adverse consequence" or injury, as in
Trafficante. It made no effort to determine whether the testers were worse off
in some factual sense, i.e., whether they had suffered some economic or non-
economic injury "in fact." To the contrary, it held that if "the tester
... approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive
false information," it would not "negate the simple fact of injury within the
meaning of § [36]04(d).'03  Under common law claims like fraudulent in-
ducement, we normally require plaintiffs to show that they relied on the false
information because, without such a showing, it seems unlikely that the
plaintiff suffered any injury. As interpreted in Havens Realty, § 3604(d)
eliminates that requirement.
Judge Posner and several commentators have noted that the idea that such
an individual has suffered a factual injury is difficult to swallow.3 4 I would
go further and state that, in at least some instances, the tester might be better
off after having received the false information. The tester, in general, is an
individual committed to eradicating discrimination from the field of housing,
and may truly believe that the persons being "tested" engage in illegal
discrimination but have yet to be detected. It is not altogether unreasonable
to assume that a tester might be elated or receive some other form of "mental
joy"-or whatever the name for the opposite of mental distress is-upon
go home and eat dinner) has no Fair Housing Act implication. See Schwemm, supra
note 1, at 9 (in discussing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969),
Professor Schwemm notes that plaintiff's "injury lay not just in the fact that the
defendants interfered with his right to live in that house but that they did so because
of his race" (emphasis in original)).
131. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374.
132. Id. at 375.
133. Id. at 374.
134. Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J.) ("The standing of the testers is, as an original matter, dubious.., they
suffer no harm other than that which they invite in order to make a case against the
persons investigated"). See, e.g., Winter, supra note 21, at 1483 ("Neither [white nor
black tester] has suffered an injury in fact"); Fletcher, supra note 15, at 253 ("when
the Court has decided.., cases involving statutory rights, it has never required any
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learning that his or her efforts have contributed to the ferreting out of
evil.
35
Second, by using the statute to assume an injury "in fact," the Court
sidestepped the analysis in Trafficante and Gladstone, in which the Court
discerned various actual injuries to the plaintiffs (the loss of the benefits of
interracial association, a diminished tax base, etc.). It would not have been
impossible to fit Havens Realty into that scheme if the plaintiffs alleged an
injury like mental distress or the stigma from having been treated
unequally-the kind of "dignity tort" that the Court will recognize as an injury
"in fact."'36 But that, of course, would have required that the plaintiffs to
allege and prove that they did suffer mental distress,'37 a step that this
second vision of the statutory rights gambit avoids. 38
135. See United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992) ("In fact,
a tester who helps expose discrimination could conceivably experience certain
satisfaction in helping to correct wrongful conduct. Some testers could even be
pleased with the success of their undercover operations").
136. I assume here that "testers" with no interest in housing could still allege that
they were "personally" treated in an unequal manner, fitting themselves under Heckler
v. Mathews rather than Allen v. Wright. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
I also assume that the "testers" would not be disqualified by reason of the fact that
they had invited the injury by participating as testers or because their mental distress
might not occur until they heard the results of the other tests (assuming they did not
know them in advance). See Balistrieri, 981 F.2d at 933 (fact that testers did not
suffer emotional distress immediately through contact with defendants, but rather later
upon learning of results of other testers, did not break the causal chain).
137. The plaintiffs in Balistrieri were successful in making precisely such a
claim. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d at 930-33 (upholding jury award of $2000 in emotional
distress damages for each tester).
138. Professor LeBel makes this point somewhat differently when he constructs
an argument that the Court erred in denying standing to the white tester in Havens
Realty. According to LeBel, the fact that the white tester did not have his right to
truthful information violated should not have been dispositive because, under
Trafficante and Gladstone, any injury should have been sufficient, and the Court made
no effort to determine if the white tester was injured in any other way. LeBel, supra
note 10, at 1018-19. LeBel argues that everyone to whom a "total package of informa-
tion" which violated the Act was directed should have standing; an "informational
injury" is inflicted on all who are part of a group in which some of them were steered.
Id, at 1021-22 & n.45. Compare Winter, supra note 21, at 1483-84 (white and black
testers "had the same relationship to the case and the same purely representational
relationship to the real beneficiaries of the statute").
LeBel's assertion that the white tester in Havens Realty suffered an
"informational injury" is less than convincing. (It is, for example, not the least bit
clear that white people, who had not been given any false information, were being
"steered" anywhere.) His point that the Court made no effort to ascertain whether the
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Third, Havens Realty, when read with Gladstone, makes clear that
Congress has two different methods of modifying the standing rules, each one
independent of the other. Footnote 9 of Gladstone makes plain that Congress
can remove prudential barriers without creating any "legal rights" the violation
of which would constitute an injury for Article III purposes.'39 And Havens
Realty makes clear that Congress can create a "legal right" regardless of
whether the "prudential barriers" have been removed.'
Recognition of the fact that Congress has two different means of
modifying the rules of standing lends some perspective to the oft-quoted
phrase that the "injury-causation-redressability" requirement is a constitutional
minima that Congress cannot abrogate.' When Congress wants to simply
eliminate certain standing rules, it is so limited. It can only eliminate
prudential barriers. But if Congress uses the statutory rights gambit, and
creates a legal right the violation of which will meet the injury "in fact"
requirement, it can indeed "abrogate" the Article III minima because the Court
will not examine the "factual" existence of an "injury" beyond the violation
of a legal right.'42
white tester had been injured in any other way or to fit his claim into a Gladstone
footnote 9 analysis, however, is well taken. One could argue that an individual who
has been treated favorably for improper reasons may suffer some sort of "stigma" or
mental distress, akin to embarrassment from being the recipient of unfair advantages.
Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 63 U.S.L.W. 4523, 4534, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
4037, *75 (U.S. June 12, 1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("benign" programs involving
race discrimination "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them
to develop dependencies.. ."). See also 63 U.S.L.W. at 4536 n. 5, 1995 U.S. LEXIS
4037, at *87 n. 5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See supra note 62.
140. Indeed, it would seem that when Congress creates a "legal right" the
violation of which constitutes an injury for Article III purposes, the "prudential
barriers" become irrelevant. If Congress gave someone a "legal right," that individual
is in the "zone of interests" of the Congressional enactment, is not asserting the rights
of a third person, and is not, at least in the usual case, asserting a "generalized griev-
ance." See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As An Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 886 (1983) ("when the legislature
explicitly says that a private right exists, this so-called 'prudential' inquiry is
displaced") (emphasis in original).
141. E.g., Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979)
("In no event, however, may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiff must
always have suffered 'a distinct and palpable injury to himself ... that is likely to be
redressed if the requested relief is granted").
142. Professor Schwemm, writing prior to Havens Realty, suggests that some Fair
Housing Act cases can be understood as the Court "deferring" to Congress'
interpretation of Article III, which renders such cases inconsistent with the notion that
there is an Article III "minima" which Congress cannot abrogate. Schwemm, supra
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Concededly both the Supreme Court and the lower courts'43 have used
fuzzy language on occasion which confuse the two methods of modifying the
standing rules. Moreover, after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the confusion
has only increased.' Nonetheless, the different methods of modifying the
standing rules are particularly important for determining standing under the
Fair Housing Act since the Court has applied both of them.
Finally, it deserves mention that the method of statutory interpretation in
Havens Realty was very much a "plain meaning" interpretation. It would not
have been altogether unreasonable to interpret the word "person" in Section
3604(d) to mean a person with a real interest in housing. The Court did not
go that way. Congress said "any person," it must have meant "any person,"
and more importantly for purposes of Havens Really, it must have wanted to
confer the legal right in question upon "any person."
In finding that the Fair Housing Act either has removed prudential
barriers or has created a "legal right," the Court is presumably just interpreting
the statute. That is, for a case of statutory standing, the Court is trying to do
what the critics of modem standing doctrine want it to do: make a
determination on the merits as to whom Congress wanted to give standing.
Thus, critics argue that the entire enterprise of determining "standing" is of no
particular use here, and the Court would be better off simply recognizing that
it is making a "merits" determination.'45  Moreover, by failing to
comprehend the relationship between standing and the "merits," the Court has
note 1, at 46-49. This is not implausible, but I believe that the theory suggested in the
text is more consistent with subsequent case law.
143. The lower courts have sometimes cited with approval the EEOC position
that Title VII grants all individuals a "right" to a workplace free from the burdens of
discrimination. E.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir.
1976) ("EEOC ... has consistently held that the statute grants an employee the right
to a working environment free of racial intimidation"); E.E.O.C. v. Bailey, 563 F.2d
439, 454 (6th Cir. 1977) ("the EEOC has interpreted Title VII to confer upon every
employee the right to a working environment free from unlawful racial discrimina-
tion") (citing various EEOC opinions). It would seem more consistent with footnote
9 of Gladstone to say that people injured in that way can sue regardless of whether
they have a personal "right" to such a workplace.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 147-167.
145. See Schwemm, supra note 1, at 23 (in Traffieante "standing" and "merits"
were functional equivalents), 49, 66-67 (all standing questions in housing cases are
reduced to matters of statutory interpretation) and 57 (Gladstone conflates merits and
standing); Winter, supra note 21, at 1461 ("[i]n the private rights context, the concept
of standing is entirely unnecessary").
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made some questionable calls," and has led the lower courts to even more
questionable calls.
c. The Statutory Rights Gambit After Defenders
In 1992, the Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,'47 a case that
Professor Sunstein has said "may well be one of the most important standing
cases since World War II" and, in terms of number of statutes apparently
invalidated, "ranks among the most important in history."'48  Defenders
involved an interpretation of Endangered Species Act of 1973 by the Interior
Department that limited the obligation which the statute imposed upon all
federal agencies, viz., to consult with the Interior Secretary to insure that all
agency actions were not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered. species,'49 to agency actions taken in the United States.
Plaintiffs challenged that interpretation as inconsistent with the statute. 50
The Court first held that the plaintiffs did not have a specific, concrete,
particularized injury "in fact," and a plurality further held that even if such an
injury could be discerned, it was not redressable."' In the part of the deci-
sion most relevant to the discussion here, the Court then considered a
provision of the statute that permitted "any person" to commence a civil suit
to enjoin anyone violating the statute. 2 The Court held that Congress did
not have the authority, under Article III, to grant standing to individuals who
had suffered no injury in fact.' Specifically, the Court held that in
146. E.g., Winter, supra note 21, at 1488 (problem with cases like Trafficante
and Havens Realty is that "the Court ascribes to Congress the creation of 'rights' that,
doubtless, Congress never considered").
147. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
148. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 165.
149. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2) (West 1985).
150. The decision focused on the standing of the environmental organization
Defenders of Wildlife. Defenders premised its standing as a representative of members
who claimed various injuries to their aesthetic interests, as well as a right to sue under
the provision permitting all citizens to sue. See infra note 199.
151. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 562-571.
152. The Endangered Species Act provides that "any person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf.., to enjoin any person, including the United States and
any other governmental instrumentality or agency.., who is alleged to be in violation
of any provision of this chapter." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1985).
153. Thus, the Court ruled that the provision granting standing to "any person"
was unconstitutional, although even this conclusion is not obvious from the decision
and has been disputed. Compare Breger, supra note 22, at 1211-12 ("The Court
... did not say that the statute was unconstitutional ... One may read the Court's
decision, therefore, as implicitly construing the phrase 'any person' who may seek
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defining "injury," Congress was limited to creating Article III dejure injuries
from previously existing de facto injuries." 4
The consequences of this decision would be particularly severe for the
Fair Housing Act. As already noted, the Court in Havens Realty did nothing
to ascertain whether the false information suffered by the testers was a
previously existing de facto injury, and it is far from clear that it was. As
Dean Nichol has noted, it does not seem that black testers like those in Havens
Realty would have standing if Scalia's opinion in Defenders becomes the
standard analytic framework for statutory standing.'55 If he is right, then
Professor Schwemm's prediction in 1980-that the chanceswere slim that "the
Court would ever hold that a plaintiff's injury is covered by Title VIII but that
it is inadequate to meet article III requirements"' 56-may be sorely tested.
In addition to being difficult to reconcile with the holding of Havens
Realty, the opinion in Defenders appears to be inconsistent with language in
certain earlier opinions as well. For example, in Linda R.S. v. Richard
D.,"5 7 the Court stated in dicta that the requirement of an actual injury was
judicial review under the Act to mean 'any aggrieved person"') with Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 200 ("the Court held in effect that this provision was unconstitutional as
applied"). See also, e.g., Roberts, supra note 22, at 1221, 1227 (questioning the
Court's conclusion that Congress wanted to grant standing to all persons).
The distinction between these two interpretations of Defenders has some rather
important consequences. If the Court held only that Congress only wanted "actually
injured" persons to bring actions, then the plaintiffs in that case were out of court. If
the Court held that Congress wanted to give "all citizens" standing, then the statute is
"unconstitutional" only to the extent that the plaintiffs tried to sue in federal court,
where Article III applies. There does not seem to any reason why the plaintiffs in
Defenders could not go into state court to pursue their claim. Indeed, the decision of
the state court in such a case would be unreviewable by the Supreme Court. Doremus
v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952). See Schwemm, supra note 1, at 12
n.49 and authorities cited therein.
154. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 578 (Congress can "elevat[e] to the status of legally
cognizable injuries concrete, defacto injuries that were previously inadequate in law").
155. Nichol, supra note 4, at 1158 n.125; Pierce, supra note 4, at 1179. Cf
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 230 n.296 (suggesting that Congressionally-created property
interest in Defenders and Havens Realty were similar). Indeed, the entire development
of standing law under the Fair Housing Act cannot be reconciled with the vision of the
statutory rights gambit described in Defenders. If Congress can only recognize
otherwise defacto injuries as "legal right" injuries, there would have been no point in
Congress creating any such legal rights in the Fair Housing Act. After all, as the
Court recognized in Trafficante and Gladstone, it had already given anyone actually
injured standing to sue. Why would it also create legal rights if that only authorized
standing for those same "actually injured" people?
156. Schwemm, supra note 1, at 53.
157. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
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needed "at least in the absence of a statute expressly conferring standing" and
that the invasion of a statutorily-created right "creates standing, even though
no injury would exist without the statute."'5 8
Justice Scalia's decision is also difficult to reconcile with the Court's
previous cases recognizing the propriety of nominal damages. 9 Nominal
damages, after all, are a recognition of the fact that the plaintiff has not
suffered an "injury," not even mental distress, for which we can provide
damages. Rather, the violation of law is considered sufficiently important that
a declaration of rights is deemed appropriate."6
I do not, however, view the Defenders decision as quite the apocalypse
that others do.' Although Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by five other
Justices for its discussion of the "citizen standing" provision, Justice Kennedy
(joined by Justice Souter) wrote separately to set forth his "interpretation" of
the majority's decision. Whether or not the word "interpretation" accurately
characterizes Justice Kennedy's opinion, his opinion obviously carries
significant weight because without him and Justice Souter, Justice Scalia's
opinion would have lacked a majority. 6 Justice Kennedy's concurrence
saw the flaw in the statute in a somewhat more limited way. Justice Kennedy
158. Id. at 617 & n.3. Linda KS. thus went a bit past Justice White's
concurrence in Trafficante, which stated only that the injuries identified by the majority
would not be Article III injuries without the statute. Linda R.S. strongly suggests that
some "injuries" under a statute would not be injuries at all. Id.
159. E.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
160. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress specifically authorized plaintiffs
to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief or nominal damages in an employment
discrimination case, even where the defendant can prove that the plaintiff would not
have obtained an employment benefit if the discrimination had not occurred and that
the plaintiff has suffered no other injury. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West
1995). Taken to its logical conclusion, Defenders would seem to cast doubt on plain-
tiffs' standing to obtain such relief.
161. Several commentators have argued that Justice Scalia used the Defenders
decision to incorporate a radical view of standing that he had previously discussed in
his Suffolk Law Review article. Scalia, supra note 140. See Meeks, supra note 91,
at 355-73; Nichol, supra note 4, at 1147-48; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 164-65, 168
(relationship between Scalia's 1983 article and Defenders is "sharp and clear").
162. Even the harshest critics of Defenders usually note the importance of Justice
Kennedy's opinion. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 4, at 1181 ("unlike the constitutional
flaw identified in the majority opinion, the constitutional flaw identified by the concur-
ring Justices is easy to correct"); Nichol, supra note 4, at 1164-65 & n.166 (noting that
majority and concurrers might reach different conclusions over hypothetical statute);
Meeks, supra note 91, at 363 n.200 (Kennedy "suspected" that Scalia was trying to
elevate the "no generalized grievances" concern to constitutional status and reaffirmed
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wrote that Congress could define any sort of "statutory injury," so long as it
was "concrete,"'" but that it must "identify the injury it seeks to vindicate
and relate the injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit."",
Congress can create a legal right not to see the color purple, this view seems
to hold, but it must make it clear that that is the right whose invasion creates
an injury affords standing. It cannot simply declare an aversion to the color
purple and give all citizens the right to sue when someone violates its anti-
purple law. In Kennedy's view, the flaw in the Endangered Species Act was
that it did not identify the "injury" that was supposedly inflicted upon any
persons by a violation of the Act.'65
In this regard, Justice Kennedy did not make a significant change in the
statutory rights gambit. He did not, for example, limit the injuries that
Congress could define to pre-existing de facto injuries, he merely wanted a
clear statement of what the injury is. From this view, Congress cannot merely
grant individuals a right to standing without explaining why, and the decision
is not inconsistent with prior precedent."6 Justice Kennedy may have an
163. Defenders, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Thus, Kennedy
agreed with Scalia that Congress cannot "in the absence of any showing of concrete
injury, [require the Court] to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper
administration of-the laws." Id. Kennedy did state, though, that the Court "must be
sensitive to the articulation of new rights of action that do not have clear analogs in
our common-law tradition." Id, at 580.
164. Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. Thus, Dean Nichol believes that a statute that specifically stated that "[a]ll
persons have a legally cognizable interest in reducing potential threats to the survival
of endangered species" would pass constitutional muster under Kennedy's analysis.
Nichol, supra note 4, at 1164-65.
166. Indeed, contrary to the suggestions of Dean Nichol and Professor
Pierce-see Nichol, supra note 4, at 1146-47 ("The U.S. Supreme Court, for the first
time in modem Article III analysis, concluded that even though a federal statute sought
to bestow standing upon a potential plaintiff, such a grant of jurisdiction violated the
strictures of the case or controversy requirement"); Pierce, supra note 4, at 1178 ("The
Court had never before held unconstitutional a statutory provision that authorized
judicial review of an agency action at the behest of members of a statutorily specified
class")-the Court's opinion in Defenders was not without precedent. In McClure v.
Carter, the court affirmed a district court decision which had held unconstitutional a
provision which allowed any member of Congress to bring a suit challenging the
appointment of Judge Abner Mikva as a violation of the emoluments clause, Article
I, § 6, cl. 2. McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265 (D. Idaho 1981), aft'd, McClure v.
Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981). (Judge Mikva was a Congressman at the time of his
appointment and there apparently had been a salary increase during the period he had
served.) The district court found no injury to the plaintiff, Senator McClure of Idaho
(a Senator who had opposed Mikva's appointment), and the Supreme Court affirmed.
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overly formalistic view of what Congress must do, but it is a formalism that,
once known, is fairly easy to meet.' 67
While this interpretation addresses some of the concerns raised by the
critics of Defenders, it must be conceded that Justice Kennedy's view creates
some anomalous results in statutory interpretation. Where Congress said very
little about standing, as in Havens Realty, the Court was willing to interpret
a law that prohibited a certain set of acts against "any person" as conferring
a "right" on such individuals, the violation of which would constitute an injury
for purposes of Article III, and which would thus give standing to those whose
"rights" were violated. Yet where Congress made a specific statement about
standing, as in Defenders, the Court was not willing to accept it because there
was no discussion of "injury" or "rights." Thus, under Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, and perhaps in considering the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
as a whole, it appears that the best way for Congress to authorize broad
standing is to say as little about it as possible.
C. Causation
The controversial decisions concerning the second element of Article III
standing, causation, have involved actions challenging government action,
where the Court expresses doubt that the illegal acts that the governmental
defendants are allegedly perpetrating are causing the injury about which
plaintiffs are complaining.6 8 Where damages against private parties are in-
In keeping with Dean Nichol's suggestion that Congress creatively define
"injuries", see supra note 165, one could imagine Congress trying to remedy the flaw
in the statute involved in McClure by defining an interest for each legislator in the
constitutionality of Congress' acts, and suffering a stigmatic "injury" by being a part
of a legislative body acting in an unconstitutional manner (regardless of whether the
individual legislator supported the act).
167. Compare Defenders, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J. concurring) ("This
requirement is not just an empty formality").
168. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-66 (1984) (it is too speculative to
assume that diminished ability of plaintiffs' children to receive a desegregated
education is being caused by improper and insufficient enforcement of IRS rule pre-
cluding tax-exempt status for private schools that racially discriminate); Simon v.
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 42-43 (1976) (too speculative to
assume that the denial of hospital services to plaintiffs was a consequence of IRS rule
that lowered threshold of medical services required to be provided to poor people in
order to obtain tax-exempt status); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-10 (1975) (too
speculative to assume that failure of Town of Pennfield to enact program supporting
building of housing for low-to-moderate income people affected low-to-moderate
income people living in nearby city of Rochester, or taxpayers in Rochester); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-18 (1973) (it is too speculative to assume that
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volved, the concerns are far less substantial. 6 9 Presumably, all that would
be needed for causation in such cases is the same sort of showing involved in
most tort cases: proximate cause, Le., "but for" causation plus a limited causal
chain. 7 In a private damages cases, the only damages that should be
recovered are those caused by the defendants' acts (or those that are
specifically authorized by statute or common law, like punitive damages or
attorneys' fees). If a plaintiff has some element of damages caused by
defendants' acts, he or she has met Article III requirements.'
II
In Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co.,' the Second Circuit
took the Havens Realty paradigm and concluded that the Fair Housing Act
granted all persons a right not to see advertising which indicates an illegal
preference. This section examines that decision, and compares its
prosecution of delinquent father for child support payments would result in payments
being made). Compare Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study, 438 U.S. 59, 78-81
(1978) (environmental group had standing based on claim that Price-Anderson Act
encouraged development ofnuclear power plants which injured its members by thermal
pollution; argument by power company that Price-Anderson did not "cause"
development because Congress would have taken other steps to ensure development
of nuclear power industry deemed too speculative).
169. Cf. Sprigman, supra note 51, at 1663 (distinguishing causation and
redressability in private law context from those same elements in public law context).
170. See Schwemm, supra note 1, at 8 n.29 (quoting PROSSER ON TORTS § 41
(4th ed. 1971)) ("With respect to causation [under Article III], it is well established
that '[a]n essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that
matter for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act
or omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered[.]"').
171. The third Article III element, redressability, has been said by the Court to
be a variation on causation. Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19 ("causation" addresses
relationship between plaintiff's injury and defendant's conduct; "redressability" focuses
on the relationship between plaintiffs injury and requested relief); see also Gottlieb,
supra note 91, at 1085 n.130. Redressability is not an issue in a claim for damages
against a private party, since damages will always redress an injury. But cf Sunstein,
supra note 9, at 203 n.197 (asserting that the idea that there was redressability in
Havens Realty and Trafficante was "odd"). Professor Sunstein is wrong in this
instance. Once you assume that the plaintiffs in Trafficante and Havens Realty
suffered injuries, then damages are a perfectly appropriate remedy. (And equitable
relief is appropriate to the extent that there is a need to prevent future harm to the
plaintiffs.) It may, of course, be difficult to specify the precise amount of damages
attributable to the loss of interracial associations, but difficulty of proving damages is
a problem hardly unique to fair housing cases.
172. 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993).
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interpretation of the Fair Housing Act with the interpretation of similar
statutes.
Harry Macklowe involved allegations that the defendant, a leasing and
managing agent for two luxury apartments in Manhattan, placed
advertisements in The New York Times.' These advertisements depicted
human models, most of whom were white, 74 and were said to violate
Section 3604(c)'75 of the Fair Housing Act by indicating a preference in the
sale or rental of housing on the basis of race. 76 The plaintiffs were four
black individuals who saw the advertisements and an organization whose
mission was to eliminate discrimination from the New York housing mar-
ket. 77 For purposes of discussing the standing of the individual plaintiffs,
the court assumed that they were not actively looking for apartments at the
time that they viewed the advertisements placed by the defendants.'
The court went through the Supreme Court's analysis in Havens Realty
and concluded that "[t]here is no significant difference between the statutorily
recognized injury suffered by the tester in Havens Realty and the injury
suffered by the [individual plaintiffs], who were confronted by advertisements
indicating a preference based on race."'79 The court concluded that the dis-
trict court (which had reached the same conclusion)' was "constrained to
find that the individual plaintiffs had standing." 181
Even on its own terms, that is, as an interpretation of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Havens Realty, the decision of the Second Circuit is hardly
a tour de force. In Havens Realty, the Court emphasized that Section 3604(d)
prohibited the provision of false information to "any person," and the Court
relied on this language to conclude that Congress wanted to grant a "right" to
precisely that class of people, i.e., persons.'82 Section 3604(c) contains no
173. Harry Macklowe, 6 F.3d at 902.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 6.
176. I have previously described other aspects of the decision in Harry
Macklowe, and the general problems raised by it and other cases based upon all-white
model advertising. Michael E. Rosman, Ambiguity And The First Amendment: Some
Thoughts On All-White Advertising, 61 TENN. L. REV. 289, 330-333 (1993).
177. Harry Macklowe, 6 F.3d at 901-02.
178. Id. at 904.
179. Id.
180. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 801 F. Supp. 1213, 1229
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 6 F.3d 898 (2d Cir. 1993).
181. Harry Macklowe, 6 F.3d at 904. See also Katherine G. Steams, Comment,
Countering Implicit Discrimination in Real Estate Advertisements: A Call for the
Issuance of Human Model Injunctions, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1200, 1221 n.100 (1994).
182. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (italicizing
the words "any person" in quoting the statute, and concluding that "Congress has thus
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reference to "persons" or any subset thereof, and is, indeed, the only
subsection of Section 3604 that has no such reference. The Court could
conceivably have concluded that the absence of any specifically defined group
to whom the duty of Section 3604(c) was owed distinguished that subsection
from the other provisions of Section 3604, and required a different result as
to standing.
Professor Winter has made a similar point in trying to explain certain
Supreme Court decisions on standing. Professor Winter asks why the
Supreme Court has found "informational rights" (the deprivation of which will
give an individual standing) under the Fair Housing Act and the Freedom of
Information Act,' but, at the same time, has held that an individual de-
prived of information requested pursuant to the statement and account clause
of the United States Constitution'84 has no standing.'85 Professor Winter
suggests that the differing results might be explained by the fact that the
statement and account clause, unlike the FHA and FOIA, only states what the
government should do and does not address the problem of individual persons
who ask for information.'86 Similarly, Section 3604(c) only states what is
unlawful. It does not state to whom the protection is afforded.
More importantly, by focusing on "rights" granted by the statute (as
Havens Realty instructed), the analysis of the Second Circuit in Harry
Macklowe seems to obscure the underlying goal of a statutory standing
inquiry, viz., whom did Congress want to enforce the provision in question?
In Havens Realty, the Court focused on the words "any person" (which
specifically described those to whom improper statements could not be made)
and concluded, without going past those words, that a "right" had been granted
and that, Congress wanted all such individuals to have standing. In Harry
Macklowe, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion about
congressional intent without the assistance of those words. But is it really a
sensible conclusion that Congress wanted everyone who reads a newspaper to
conferred on all 'persons' a legal right to truthful information").
183. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 552-552b (West 1993).
184. Article I provides that "a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
185. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). See supra text
accompanying notes 98-99.
186. Winter, supra note 21, at 1495-96. Professor Winter, to be fair, believes
that the differing results are a consequence of an "individualist metaphor" that
improperly dominates our understanding of standing. Whatever the truth of that claim,
the "metaphor" about which Professor Winter speaks is one he attributes to the
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have standing? Should not a court want a significant amount of clarity in the
statute or conclusive legislative history before reaching that conclusion?
Harry Macklowe is also intriguing, as was Havens Realty, for the road
not taken. Each of the individual plaintiffs in Harry Macklowe alleged that
he or she had suffered emotional damages, and were awarded $2500 in
compensatory damages." 7 If such emotional damage constituted an injury
"in fact," then the court could have used simple Trafficante-Gladstone
analysis, and avoided all mention of "rights."lSS After all, even if the "right"
not to see discriminatory advertisement is limited to those actually seeking
housing, it seems safe to assume that someone's rights were violated by the
discriminatory advertising at issue. Footnote 9 of Gladstone does the rest.
Along the same lines, it is curious that the Second Circuit, while citing
Defenders for the proposition that an injury may exist solely by virtue of the
violation of a right created by statute," 9 made no mention of the suggestion
in Defenders that only preexisting de facto injuries could be used in the
creation of such rights. In Harry Macklowe, the better part of valor was to
avoid any investigation of the amorphous contours the Supreme Court has
given to "factual" injuries.
Given the statutory interpretation given to Section 3604(c) by the Second
Circuit, it is once again instructive to examine the interpretations given to
similar language in similar statutes. Both the Section 704(b) in Title VII 90
187. I have previously noted the First Amendment problems that might arise for
a statute that provides for damages for improper advertising to an entire newspaper
readership, with no required showing of intent, and no required proof of how the
advertising is understood by the relevant audience. See Rosman, supra note 176, at
336-50.
188. Whether the emotional damage suffered by the plaintiffs in HarryMacklowe
constituted injury "in fact" (apart from the statute) would depend upon whether the
violation of Section 3604(c) would be considered unequal treatment personal to the
plaintiff (as in Hecklerv. Mathews) or a generalized grievance (as in Allen v. Wright).
See text accompanying notes 92-103. The answer to that question is not obvious from
the precedents, but it deserves mention that categorizing the "stigma" or mental distress
suffered by the reader as "personal" would allow readers in Hawaii to sue for discrim-
inatory advertisements published with respect to a Maine apartment complex, the sort
of concern that seemed to animate the Court in Allen. See supra note 103 and
accompanying text. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984). Of course, precisely
the same Hawaii-to-Maine result occurs by giving all readers the "right" to non-
discriminatory advertisement, precisely the result reached in Harry Macklowe.
Compare Sunstein, supra note 9, at 205 ("legal injury" concept "means ... that a
person in New York has no standing to challenge racial discrimination in Iowa, as no
law treats distant discrimination as an injury").
189. Harry Macklowe, 6 F.3d at 904.
190. Section 704(b) makes it illegal for employers, employment agencies, and
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and Section 4(e) of the ADEA'9 ' prohibit discriminatory advertisements in
language quite similar to that in Section 3604(c). Yet the lower
courts-admittedly prior to Havens Realty-have held that an individual must
have an actual interest in the employment in question and be deterred by the
advertisements in order to have standing under the discriminatory advertising
provisions of the employment discrimination statutes. 92 Perhaps more
striking is the fact that the EEOC, hardly an organization that one would
suspect of unduly narrowing plaintiffs' rights in the employment discrimina-
tion area, 93 maintains the same position, and has maintained the same
position both before and after Havens Realty.'94
certain others, to
print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or
advertisement relating to employment ... indicating any preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, except that such a notice or advertisement may
indicate a preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination based on
religion, sex, or national origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification for employment.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3(b) (West 1995).
191. "It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment
agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or
advertisement relating to employment ... indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on age." 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(e) (West 1985).
192. Banks v. Heun-Norwad, 566 F.2d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 1977) (although
employer violated Section 704(b) by advertising for a "male accountant," the court
affirmed judgment for employer because "plaintiff was not deterred from inquiring
about the job" by the advertisement; "she failed to pursue the matter 'because the
salary range was too low'"); Hailes v. United Airlines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (5th
Cir. 1972) (individual who reasonably believed from advertisement under "Help
Wanted-Female" that his application for stewardess position would be futile had
standing).
193. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (EEOC
interpretation entitled to "great deference").
194. Prior to Havens Realty, the EEOC repeatedly held that an individual must
have an actual interest in the job being advertised to have standing. See EEOC Dec.
No. 75-21 (Sept, 4, 1974), 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1806 (complainant lacked
standing where she "has produced no evidence to indicate a real, present interest in the
employment advertised"); EEOC Decision 75-6 (July 30, 1974), 11 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1498 (complainant lacked standing where there was no "claim or evidence
that she had.., an actual interest in any of the jobs advertised"); EEOC Decision 74-
30 (Jan. 31, 1974), 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 553 (complainant lacked standing
when her basis for standing is merely her "status as a concerned citizen"). The EEOC
Compliance Manual still maintains this position. See'2 EEOC Compl. Man. pt. 1,
§ 605.3, p. 605-3 (1983); 2 EEOC Compl. Man. pt. 2, § 632.2(f), p. 632-8 (1986).
1995]
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The Lanham Act provides an even more interesting contrast. Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act prohibits any person from "us[ing]... any... false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which- (B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities or geographic origin of his or her or another person's
goods, services, or commercial activities[.]"'95 It further creates a private
right of action for the benefit of "any person who believes that he or she is or
is likely to be damaged by such act."' 96 That is, the Lanham Act is a law
against false advertising, and specifically grants standing to "damaged" (as
opposed to aggrieved or injured) persons. Yet not only have the courts not
created a "right" to truthful advertising from the Lanham Act, a violation of
which would give standing to any reader, most courts (with the Second Circuit
leading the way) limit standing to competitors of the defendant, and do not
even allow actual purchasers of the product standing.'97
Once again, the statutory standing decisions in the Fair Housing Act seem
to reach peculiar results which are significantly different from the
interpretation of similar or nearly identical language in other statutes. In the
last section of this article, I will briefly explore some suggested rules for inter-
preting standing provisions of statutes that would result in more sensible (or,
at least, more uniform) decisions. Prior to that, however, I examine one other
area of Fair Housing Act standing: the standing granted to organizational
plaintiffs, where the "citizen standing" ostensibly killed by Defenders of Wild-
life has snuck in the back door.
III
Fair Housing Act litigation frequently has been brought by "fair housing
organizations," private organizations dedicated to the principle of non-
195. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
196. Id.
197. Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation,
475 F. Supp. 928, 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); LeBlanc v. Spector, 378 F. Supp. 301,304-05
(D. Conn. 1973); State of Florida ex rel. Boward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F.
Supp. 364, 366-67 (S.D. Fla. 1971). But see Maguire v. Sandy Mac, Inc., 138 F.R.D.
444, 447 (D.N.J. 1991) ("federal circuits have split on the question of consumer
standing under the Lanham Act"), vacated in part, 145 F.R.D. 50 (D.N.J. 1992)
(consumer standing under Lanham Act still an open question in Third Circuit). See
generally Jean Wegman Bums, The Paradox Of Antitrust And Lanham Act Standing,
42 UCLA L. REv. 47, 64-66 (1994). As Professor Bums accurately notes, the Lanham
Act standing cases denying consumer standing seem directly contradicted by the plain
language of the statute. Id. at 96.
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discriminatory housing.' In general, organizations are permitted standing
on two different grounds: as a representative of its members (third-party
standing) or based upon an injury to itself (first-party standing). For several
reasons, fair housing organizations usually seek standing on the latter
ground.'"
The standard for first-party standing was set forth in Havens Realty.
There the Court ruled that "first-party" standing for organizations involves "the
same inquiry as in the case of an individual,"2" presumably the tri-partite
inquiry required by Article III. Since the subsequent analysis of the Court has
been used (or, in my opinion, misused) extensively, it deserves full quotation:
In the instant case, [plaintiff's] complaint contained the following claims of
injury to the organization:
"Plaintiff ... has been frustrated by defendants' racial steering
practices in its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling
and other referral services. Plaintiff... has had to devote significant
resources to identify and counteract the defendant's racially discriminatory
[policy]."
If, as broadly alleged, [defendants'] steering practices have perceptibly
impaired [plaintiff's] ability to provide counseling and referral services for
low- and moderate-income homeseekers, there can be no question that the
organization has suffered injury in fact. Such concrete and demonstrable
198. See Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 90, at 14 (the typical fair housing
organization has four functions: educating the general public, counseling individuals,
investigating discriminatory complaints, and pursuing legal remedies); Robert G.
Schwemm, Private EnforcementAnd The Fair Housing Act, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
375, 381 (1988) (local fair housing organizations "have become absolutely essential
to the effective enforcement of the Fair Housing Act").
199. There are three primary reasons why fair housing organizations do not
employ "representational" standing. First, to use this form of standing, organizations
must be either membership organizations or have a membership-like structure.
American Legal Found. v. FCC, 808 F.2d 84, 89-90 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hope, Inc. v.
County of DuPage, Ill., 738 F.2d 797, 814 (7th Cir. 1984). Most fair housing
organizations, like other civil rights groups, are non-profit corporations that have no
members. Cf. Fair Employment Council v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (plaintiff that used employment discrimination testers "is not a
membership organization"). Second, "representational" standing is permitted only if
individual participation by the members being represented is not needed, a requirement
that is usually deemed to preclude a claim for damages. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 515-16 (1975). Since damages are an important element of most fair housing
claims against private defendants, "representational" standing is not used. Third, and
as described in the text, the courts have made it so easy to meet the "requirements" of
first-party standing, that it simply is not necessary to employ third-party standing.
200. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 378.
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injury to the organization's activities, with the consequent drain on the
organization's resources, constitutes far more than simply a setback to the
organization's abstract social interests. 2
1
It would be best to concede at the outset that neither the complaint quoted
by the Court, or the Court's opinion, is a model of clarity.2 2 There are at
least the following four interpretations of the latter:
1. Because of the defendants' discriminatory policies, people were
confused about their rights under the Fair Housing Act. Plaintiff-organization
was obligated to spend more money educating and counselling those
individuals than it otherwise would have.
2. Not only was plaintiff obligated to spend more money educating and
counselling its confused patrons, but plaintiff, wanting to halt this additional
expenditure of its funds, spent money trying to ascertain either who was
causing this confusion and/or in investigative efforts that would lead ultimately
to the halting of defendants' acts and the drain on plaintiff's resources.
3. Plaintiff referred people to defendants prior to learning of their
discriminatory behavior. Upon learning of defendants' discriminatory policies,
they refused to refer clients to defendants, thus limiting the available choices
it could provide for its clients.
4. Upon hearing rumors of defendants' illegal practices, plaintiff spent
time and effort organizing "testers" to investigate whether defendants were
violating the law. The time and effort expended in this project took resources
away from the counseling and referral services that plaintiff provides.
While each of the four interpretations is plausible, only the first three
(and probably only the first two) can be reconciled with previous (and
subsequent) Supreme Court decisions, all of which require a "traceable causal
connection" between the defendants' acts and the injuries suffered by the
plaintiffs. For several reasons, the last interpretation cannot.
First, in the fourth interpretation, defendants' acts did not "cause" plaintiff
to "test" them, in any usual sense of the word. Rather, plaintiff has made an
independent decision to "test" defendants, which, under normal tort principles,
breaks the chain of causation.0 3 Second, the resources spent to "test" defen-
201. Id. at 379.
202. The two quoted sentences of the complaint, for example, could be
identifying two different ways that the organization was harmed. If so, it is unclear
whether the Court's opinion is referring to only one way or both. I suggest in the text
that the second sentence, by itself (and not as a means of mitigating other forms of
damage), simply cannot be an independent injury satisfying Article III. Thus, the best
reading of the Court's opinion is to read the first quoted sentence of the complaint as
the primary damage to which the Court was referring.
203. 22 AM. JuR. 2D Damages § 478 (1988) (defendants will not be held
responsible for damages caused by intervening act of either the plaintiff or a third
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dants would have been spent regardless of what the result of the "test" was.
If the same amount of resources would have been expended regardless of
whether defendants were violating the law, then the violation cannot be said
to "cause" the expenditure of resources. Finally, the fourth interpretation
would allow anyone to have standing. The Court was setting forth a standard
for first-party standing, which it stated was the same for organizations as for
persons. Any organization-theNational Rifle Association, IBM, the National
Basketball Association-which expended resources on a "test" of potential
violators of the Fair Housing Act would have standing.2 So too would any
individual." 5
Naturally, the fourth interpretation is precisely the one adopted by the
lower courts in the years following Havens Realty. The Seventh, Second and
Sixth Circuits have decided that the resources that a fair housing organization
spends in obtaining evidence that it subsequently uses in a lawsuit against the
objects of its investigation can constitute the "injury" which gives it standing.
In Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,2"6 Judge Posner wrote that a fair housing
organization suing a broker for illegal steering in violation of Sections 3604(a)
and 3604(d) of the Fair Housing Act could rely on the resources it spent
sending testers to the broker in order to gain evidence in support of its steer-
ing allegations. Specifically, the Court held that Havens Realty "makes clear
.. that the only injury which need be shown to confer standing on a fair-
housing agency is deflection of the agency's time and money from counseling
to legal efforts directed against discrimination."2 7 In Harry Macklowe, the
party).
204. Third-party or representational standing requires that the organization have
a purpose germane to the interests it seeks to protect in the lawsuit. E.g., Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). First-party
standing has no such requirement. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 378 (involves same
inquiry as with an individual).
205. See supra note 202. Indeed, one fairly good piece of evidence that the
fourth interpretation is incorrect is the Court's denial of standing to the white tester.
The white tester expended time and effort in the "test" process just as surely as the
organizational plaintiff did. His expenditure of time and/or money also no doubt
"diverted" resources from other things he wanted to do in his life. If that was the only
criteria for standing, then the white tester met it.
206. 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir. 1990)
207. Id. at 1526. Prior to Dwivedi, the Seventh Circuit had reached the opposite
conclusion. South Suburban Housing Ctr. v. Santefort Real Estate, Inc., Appeal No.
87-1859, slip op. (7th Cir. August 17, 1988). Since the decision in Santefort was not
published, Judge Posner felt free to ignore it. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d at 1526. The
Seventh Circuit has continued to follow Dwivedi on this point. See City of Chicago
v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., Inc., 982 F.2d 1086, 1095 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 932 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Second Circuit held that the time spent by a fair housing organization trying
to remedy the all-white advertising that was the gravamen of its complaint,
including the time it spent pursuing administrative remedies required by the
FHA, diverted resources from its other activities and was sufficient to grant
it standing." 8 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held that a fair housing
organization which alleged that it "devoted resources to investigating the
defendants' practices and alleges that it has confirmed that defendants do
discriminate on the basis of familial status" had standing. 9
So, too, the administrative law judges who conduct the administrative
hearings created by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 appear to be
taking the most expansive interpretation of Havens Realty. While, of course,
systematic assessments of these decisions are more difficult, two ALJs have
recently written an article describing the kinds of damages they apparently
consider in such cases." ' They cite with approval the decision of the
district court in Saunders v. General Services Corp.,' awarding a nonprofit
organization $2,300 for "diversion of resources measured by the time and
overhead costs attributable to pursuing its Fair Housing Act claim" and
$10,000 for the frustration of its equal housing mission. 2 Citing other dis-
208. Ragin v. Harry Macklowe, 6 F.3d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 1993). Again, the
Court's reasoning, such as it is, deserves full quotation:
Spiro [of the fair housing organization the Open Housing Center, Inc.
("OHC")] testified that she and her small staff devoted substantial blocks of
time to investigating and attempting to remedy the defendants'
advertisements. For example, Spiro detailed the steps she took to file the
administrative complaint with the [State Division of Human Rights],
including identifying the buildings' developers, the marketing agent and the
advertising agent, as well as attending a conciliation conference. Spiro also
testified that the time she and her coworkers spent on matters related to this
case prevented them from devoting their time and energies to other OHC
matters.
Id.
209. Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993).
210. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 90.
211. 659 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D. Va. 1987). Saunders involved claims similar to
that in Harry Macklowe, i.e., a claim that § 3604(c) was violated by a brochure that
used pictures of white people.
212. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 90, at 15 (citing Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at
1061). The "frustration of mission" damages seem particularly odd. Contrary to the
assertion of the ALJs, the court in Saunders did not base the $10,000 award on the
ground that defendants' actions "forced" the organization to spend money to identify
and counteract the objectionable advertising. Compare Heifetz & Heinz, supra note
90, at 15, with Saunders, 659 F. Supp. at 1060-61. To the contrary, that was the
rationale behind the $2300 "diversion of resources" award.
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triet court opinions, they assert that a fair housing organization can recover
"opportunity costs" by showing that the defendants' conduct "caused" the
organization "to divert its resources from fulfilling some of its usual functions"
to do such things as "seeking redress for the defendant's discriminatory
conduct."2 3  Fair housing organizations apparently can also recover
"damages" for the costs of monitoring defendants' activities in the future. 4
This depressingly simplistic analysis of Havens Realty was, until very
recently, the only interpretation of the circuit courts.2"5 Recently, however,
the Fifth and D.C. Circuits"' have rejected the Dwivedi interpretation
of Havens Realty, the D.C. Circuit quite explicitly." It nonetheless remains
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), the Court held that an organi-
zation did not have standing merely because its organizational purpose was being frus-
trated. It is hard to understand how the "frustration of mission" award in Saunders,
or any similar award in an administrative proceeding, can be reconciled with the
holding in Sierra Club. See also infra note 215.
The ALJs do allow that if "frustration of mission" or "impairment of purpose"
damages duplicate "diversion of resources" damages, that the fair housing organizations
should not be permitted a double recovery. Heifetz & Heinz, supra note 90, at 16
("Damages should not be awarded twice for the same injuries").
213. Heifetz & Heinz, supra at 90, at 15.
214. Id. at 16.
215. In Jones v. Deutsch, 715 F. Supp. 1237, 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), Judge
Goettel did reject a claim by an institutional plaintiff claiming that it had diverted
institutional resources in an effort to prevent a village incorporation process (which
plaintiffs asserted was motivated by an improper, racially-discriminatory purpose) from
continuing. The court held that Havens Realty could not be read to authorize standing
whenever organizations "have injected themselves into [the] matter in the interest of
furthering their societal goals." Id. The court quite properly noted that the
organizational plaintiff in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (no standing
based upon interference with environmental organization's objectives) had no doubt
spent institutional resources in support of its goals, and found Sierra Club, rather than
Havens Realty, controlling. Id.
216. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas County Mental Health & Mental
Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241,244 (5th Cir. 1994) ("The mere fact that
an organization redirects some of its resources to litigation and legal counseling in
response to actions or inactions of another party is insufficient to impart standing upon
the organization. [Organization's] argument implies that any sincere plaintiff could
bootstrap standing by expending its resources in response to actions of another").
Curiously, the Fifth Circuit cited Dwivedi with a "cf" introductory signal, id., which
means that the case cited supports an analogous proposition. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION 23 (15th ed. 1991). Dwivedi, of course, does not.
217. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg.
Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
218. Id at 1277 ("We disagree with the Seventh Circuit that Havens would
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the case that fair housing organizations have the ability, in at least some
courts, and apparently in any administrative proceedings, to simply decide that
a suit is warranted and to bring one based upon an injury over which they
have total control. This is "citizens standing" writ large and without statutory
authority.
IV
Let us assume that in the very near future the critics of modem standing
law have their way: the Supreme Court junks the "injury-in-fact" test, and the
law recognizes that standing is simply part of determining whether a good
cause of action exists. Courts will look only to congressional intent to
determine if a plaintiff has standing under a federal statute. In this article, I
have tried to suggest that this concededly large step would not end all of the
inconsistencies and irrationalities of standing law because, even where courts
have been trying to do just that, their conclusions have been strangely
inconsistent and irrational nonetheless. The problem, I have suggested, is that
the constitutional dimension has obscured the statutory interpretation so that
questions relating to the constitutional standard, about removing the
"prudential barriers," and determining if Congress granted a "right," have
stymied the growth of standards in interpreting the standing provisions of
statutes.
It is easier to identify the problem than to fix it, and this article will be
no exception to that rule. Nonetheless, in this section, I do articulate several
baseline rules for the interpretation of standing provisions that I believe can
be helpful. Specifically, I suggest that both the Article III "minima" and the
prudential rules be considered baseline standards for interpreting standing
provisions, and that only the clearest congressional statement to the contrary
should be used to eliminate one or more of them. I also propose that more
attention be given to the kinds of relief that are available in a given statute
when making standing determinations.
A. Trafficante Revisited: An Exercise In Standing Interpretations
Before examining what standards ought to be applied, a quick review of
Trafficante, which I believe, reflects an approach that has little merit, should
support such a purely self-referential injury.") The D.C. Circuit also explicitly rejected
the argument (which had been adopted by the lower court) that even if the first "test"
of the defendant could not provide a basis for standing, that the subsequent tests (i.e.,
tests conducted after learning that the defendants were violating the law and thus
arguably "caused" by the violations) could. The court focused its attention on the
voluntary nature of the plaintiff's decision to run subsequent tests. Id. at 1277 n.3.
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prove worthwhile.219 In Trafficante, the Court concluded that Congress
intended to eliminate the prudential barriers to standing relying on three pieces
of evidence: (1) the language of the standing provision of Section 3610,
(2) the legislative history, and (3) the enforcement mechanisms of the
statute.
20
The language of Section 3610 refers to a "person aggrieved," which was
defined as a person who "claims to be injured." If there is something about
either of the words "aggrieved" or "injured" which would require a conclusion
that standing should be broad, the Court has never identified what it is. The
Lanham Act gives standing to those who are "damaged" (or who are likely to
be "damaged"). Why does that word not connote standing just as broad?"'
Particularly in light of the fact that a clear dichotomy between constitutional
and "prudential" standing concepts did not exist before 1970, it seems
particularly hard to grasp the argument that Congress intended to eliminate
"prudential" standing requirements in passing the FHA, Title VII, or the
ADEA (all of which were passed in the 1960's) by using the words "injured"
or "aggrieved."
219. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
220. The Court also relied upon the interpretation of the statute by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (an interpretation that apparently had
never been set forth in a regulation). Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205, 210 (1972). That interpretation only focused upon whether the injury
suffered by the specific plaintiffs before the Court was sufficient to support standing,
and did not purport to be a general interpretation of the standing provisions vis-a-vis
Article III and the prudential standing rules.
221. The antitrust laws and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions ("RICO") Act also provide an interesting contrast. Standing under those statutes
is granted to those "injured in [their] business or property by reason of' a violation of
underlying law. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (West 1984); 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 1973).
The Court specifically has rejected the contention that all those injured in their
property or business by a violation have standing, i.e., that "but for" causation is
sufficient, and has imported common-law suppositions into the standing provisions.
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 266 (1992) ("unlikel[y]
that Congress intended to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover"); Associated
Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 529-31 (1983). Moreover, in the antitrust field, a plaintiff"must prove more than
injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must prove
antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent ... ." Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (emphasis in original). Finally, the Court has limited consumer standing in the
antitrust area to preclude suits by "indirect" consumers. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977). See generally Burns, supra note 197, at 58-63.
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While the Court in Trafficante stated that the legislative history was "not
too helpful,"' it nonetheless mentioned that the proponents of the
legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects of
discrimination "had an interest"'  in ensuring fair housing. The first
problem such reliance presents is that the degree and extent to which
legislative history is used in interpreting statutes in general has diminished
over time. 4 The Court today gives more weight to the "plain meaning" of
a statute, and far less weight to the thoughts and statements of individual
legislators.' If this trend continues (as it appears it will), it will require a
change in our thinking about statutory standing provisions as well. Thus,
Professor Bums' recent analysis of standing under the Lanham Act and the
antitrust laws recognizes that the statutory language and legislative history of
the two statutes are "remarkably similar," 6 but she nonetheless contends
that differences "in the two settings" support different standing rules. 7 The
degree and extent to which the Court will consider differences in "settings" (as
Professor Bums uses that term) in interpreting statutes seems very much in
doubt. 8
222. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210.
223. Id.
224. E.g., Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline of Legislative History: Has
Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, PUB. INT. L. REV. 1994 57, 63-67
(Roger Clegg and Leonard Leo, eds. 1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative
History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 365, 366 (1990).
225. This concern over the usefulness of legislative history seems particularly
appropriate in reviewing Trafficante. In stating that "the proponents of the legislation"
had indicated that those who were not direct objects of discrimination also suffered,
the Court cited subcommittee hearings that had taken place the year before on different
bills. Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 n.10.
226. Bums, supra note 197, at 87.
227. Id. at 89. Professor Bums does support reducing the considerable
differences in the standing rules of the two laws in an effort to better reflect the similar
language of their standing provisions and legislative history. Id. at 88-102.
228. To be sure, the Court will (and should) go beyond statutory language "to
the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy." Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). But Professor Bums goes further, and considers
background assumptions about the nature of the marketplace and related legal rules to
be part of the "setting." For example, she considers whether consumers have options
other than the Lanham Act in attacking false advertising, a question on which, as her
own citations demonstrate, reasonable people can disagree. See Bums, supra note 197,
at 74-75 & nn.1 16-18 (citing authorities that other options are adequate) and at 97-99
& nn.219-26 (citing authorities that they are not). The ability to redraw the
"background" facts so as to reach a particular conclusion may be one reason why the
Court is increasing its reliance on statutory language in interpreting statutes.
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With respect specifically to the use of legislative history, like that
described in Trafficante, one wonders how much weight really should be given
to a statement that "we all benefit" from a reduction in discrimination, crime,
antitrust conspiracies, or securities fraud. One would presume that there are
very few proposed bills of any significant scope, in Congress or any other
legislative body, that are touted as serving the special interests of a narrowly-
defined group. The "we all benefit" argument is likely made quite frequently,
and with no real intention to modify fundamental standing assumptions.
Finally, the Court relied upon the "design of the Act" and the fact that
HUD had no powers of enforcement. But, of course, that situation changed
with the passage of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988."2 Now
that HUD has enforcement powers, and can hear complaints of housing
discrimination itself, should that affect who has standing? If it does not, then
should we conclude that the "design" of the Act was really rather unimportant
all along?
To be fair, the Court in Trafficante had little to go on in the way of
language or history or design or anything else. Moreover, modem standing
law was still in its infancy, and thus it may not have been altogether clear
what standards to apply in the absence of evidence. I suggest now, however,
that this dearth of evidence of Congress' intent should lead the Court to
impose both the injury-causation-redressability requirement and the prudential
rules on standing as a baseline of statutory interpretation. Congress may
eliminate those rules if it chooses, and would not be in violation of Article III.
But a clear, unambiguous statement to that effect should be required.
B. Some Rules For Interpretation of Standing Provisions
At the outset, it must be conceded that determining who Congress wanted
to give the right to enforce a particular statute will be, in many cases,
difficult. ° Frequently, as in the FHA, statutory standing provisions will be
less than clear, and some sort of background assumptions to interpret those
provisions will be needed. I argue here that the injury-causation-redressability
and prudential requirements are adequate background assumptions, particularly
for laws that primarily produce cases involving only private parties.
In assailing the constitutional analysis of the Court in recent standing
cases, the critics of modem standing law concede that the results in any given
case may be correct because the substantive law at issue may limit standing
229. See supra note 42.
230. See Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1462 ("In many standing cases, however, the
question whether Congress has created a cause of action cannot be answered simply");
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 53 ("frequently, it is not easy to make inferences from
statutory text, structure, and history").
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to certain groups. Justice Scalia, in an article written prior to his ascension
to the Court, characterized the "prudential" factors as "a set of presumptions
derived from the common-law."'" Professor Fletcher agrees that at least
some of the standing rules promulgated are "useful as presumptions or aids for
construction, often providing important interpretive context."' 2  Even
Professor Sunstein has suggested, at times, that the "injury-in-fact"
requirement may be an interpretation of the APA that "promotes autonomy
and self-determination on the part of litigants" and "that does relatively little
violence to the underlying purpose of the statute." 3
I agree with these sentiments, and perhaps would go a bit further. In
general, Congress is deemed to legislate against the backdrop of common-law
rules, which are abrogated only based upon a clear statement from Congress
or when a plain statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."4 In cases
involving suits between two private parties, no reason exists why this rule
should not be applied to standing provisions. The Article III and prudential
rules were developed over an extensive period of time in common-law actions
and have proven (or, at least, were at one time) of some assistance in keeping
courts to a limited role in a democratic society. (This is true, I believe, even
of the injury-in-fact requirement which, although only made a constitutional
requirement in recent years, has always been an aspect of common-law and
231. Scalia, supra note 140, at 886. See also id. at 896 (in interpreting statutes,
"courts should bear in mind the object of the exercise, and should not be inclined to
assume congressional designation of a 'minority group' so broad that it embraces
virtually the entire population." (emphasis in original)). Although Justice Scalia was
referring only to the "prudential" rules as derived from the common law, I will refer
to both the Article III requirements and the prudential rules as the "common-law"
rules. Cf Sunstein, supra note 11, at 55-57.
232. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 239. See also id. at 252 ("When the Court says
that Congress may create standing when prudential factors lead the Court not to find
standing, the Court says nothing more complicated than that it will not infer a cause
of action absent a clear statutory directive") and 265 (in cases where the statute is
unclear, "the Court may properly invoke background assumptions about the functions
of judicial review in certain areas, and about traditional categories of recognized
injuries and permissible plaintiffs in those areas.")
233. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 1462. See also Nichol, supra note 30, at 1927
(identifying benefits of injury-in-fact requirement, including that it "fosters self-
determination") and Nichol, supra note 4, at 1161 (if Sunstein were attempting to
determine a cause of action in a wide array of cases where Congressional intent is
unclear, he might rely on substance of the "injury-in-fact" test). But cf Sunstein,
supra note 9, at 186 (imposing injury-in-fact test "was a misreading of the APA").
234. E.g., United States v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 1631, 1634 (1993) ("Congress does
not write upon a clean slate ... In order to abrogate a common law principle, the
statute must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law."); Astoria
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169-70 (1991).
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statutory claims throughout our history.) We should not so easily, and
certainly not as easily as the Court did in Trafficante, abandon any of them
without some clear message from Congress."3s
In his most recent article, Professor Sunstein lays out two "models" to be
used in interpreting standing provisions when Congress has been silent, viz.,
the "common law" model and the "public law" model. 6 While noting that
the common law model may better explain the cases, 7 Professor Sunstein
expresses his own preference for the public law model. 8 But Sunstein's
discussion makes plain that the typical lawsuit he is considering is a lawsuit
against the government for improperly regulating private behavior. 9 He
states very little about private suits, or discrimination law, and what he does
say is inconsistent with our current understanding of how discrimination law
works.24 Whatever merit Professor Sunstein's arguments for the public law
235. Cf. Scalia, supra note 140, at 886 ("federal courts have displayed a great
readiness in recent years to discern a congressional elimination of traditional
'prudential' standing barriers with regard to challenges of federal executive action").
Compare LeBel, supra note 10, at 1038 ("practical" approach espoused by LeBel
"would avoid the need to characterize congressional action as sweeping aside all
prudential limitations on standing.")
236. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 55-62.
237. Id. at 62.
238. Id. at 64 (although there is much to be said in its favor, common-law model
is "ultimately unsound"). Some of the favorable aspects of the common-law model
mentioned by Professor Sunstein are (1) the availability of political remedies for large
groups "injured" by agency action; (2) the need to prevent the private conscription of
public resources and agency discretion, and (3) the model's superior ability to explain
past Supreme Court precedents. Id. at 55-57.
239. Thus, for example, Professor Sunstein begins his discussion of the common
law model by stating that, under that model, the "objects of regulation" should have
standing. Id. at 55. In most discrimination lawsuits, of course, the "objects of
regulation" are defendants, for whom notions of standing are irrelevant. See also id.
(common law "understanding calls for judicial caution when numerous beneficiaries
ask the government to initiate enforcement proceedings"); id at 56 (there are "good
reasons to be concerned about private conscription of public resources").
240. In his only mention of discrimination law in his discussion of the two
models, Professor Sunstein asserts:
When Congress says that schools receiving federal funds may not
discriminate on the basis of sex, it is creating an incentive for sex equality,
rather than imposing particular results on particular schools with respect to
particular students.
Id. at 58. Sunstein quickly moves on to other topics. But it deserves mention that in
equating Title IX (20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688) with other regulatory statutes, Sunstein
seems to suggest that our entire notion of how that statute works is misguided. Under
current law, victims of discrimination can bring lawsuits directly against those who
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model have in the context of statutes which require governmental agencies to
apply broad statutory directives for the benefit of significant segments of our
population, they seem to have much less effect when considering statutes in
which Congress has simply permitted one citizen to sue another for a wrong
not previously recognized under the common law.24' In short, Professor
Sunstein's arguments should not affect the interpretive presumption described
above (that Congress legislates with the common law in mind) for statutes that
provide for private causes of action.
Applying this presumption to the first means of congressional manipu-
lation of the basic standing rules, viz., the elimination of the "prudential rules,"
a relatively explicit message from Congress should be required. At the very
least, using words like "aggrieved" or "injured" (as opposed to "damaged") in
the statute ought not to be deemed sufficient.242 This seems particularly true
with respect to eliminating the "zones of interest" test, which, as we have seen,
is intended to be nothing more than an exploration of congressional intent as
to standing.
The "statutory rights" gambit is somewhat more difficult to address, but
I would argue that a similar rule should apply. Congress can indeed create an
"injury" that did not exist before; modem discrimination law is a testament to
that. But saying that does not answer the next question, viz., who has the
right in question. A law that states "do not lie to anyone" should not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that "anyone" to whom a lie is made has
standing, regardless of whether the specific "anyone" suffered any other injury.
Again, such a result seems counterintuitive, and is certainly inconsistent with
receive federal funds and who have discriminated against them. Cannon v. Univ. of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S.
60 (1992) (suit for damages based upon teacher's sexual harassment permitted). They
cannot bring a lawsuit against the federal agency providing federal funds and
responsible for ensuring that those who receive its funds are not discriminating.
Washington Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993). If Title IX
is merely a creator of incentives, like other regulatory statutes, as Sunstein suggests,
it would seem that the law should be just the opposite.
241. As Sunstein himself notes, "regulatory statutes"-the kind which he seems
to be using as a model-"are enacted not to prevent discrete harms by discrete actors,
but to restructure incentives or to ensure against what we might describe as probable
or systemic harms." Id. at 57. The discrimination laws, on the other hand, are
designed to prevent discrete harms by discrete actors.
242. In describing the differences in language between the Lanham Act standing
provision and the analogous provision in the Clayton Act, Professor Bums omits any
mention of the fact that the former uses the word "damaged" and the latter uses the
word "injured." See Bums, supra note 197, at 56-57 (most notable differences in
language are that Lanham Act has no reference to "business or property" and permits
standing to those who "believe" they are "likely" to be damaged).
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our common-law traditions.243 Congress can change the common-law
traditions if it chooses, but an assumption that they apply without a clear state-
ment from Congress to the contrary would lead, in my opinion, to more
rational results than those that we have seen in the discrimination field.
Certainly, a statutory prohibition ("do not x") should not be interpreted as
granting a "right" not to see "x" being done, as the court did in Harry
Macklowe.
The trend in fair housing cases has been to treat standing as some kind
of positive economic good; the more standing we have, the better.2' But
like ice cream, too much "standing" can create problems. For one thing,
courts can become clogged with essentially ideological litigation. Further,
there are some instances in which broadened standing can actually undercut
the rights of those most directly involved.245 It may be appropriate in some
instances for Congress to determine that the benefits of such litigation
nonetheless outweigh the societal and individual costs. But one would hope
that Congress at least will have considered the matter before drawing that
conclusion. Modem standing law in the fair housing area attributes that intent
to Congress without, I think, an overwhelming amount of evidence.
The second rule I would propose for the scope of statutory standing is to
consider the remedies permitted by the statute in determining the breadth of
the standing provision. The Supreme Court has carefully distinguished
between having (1) standing, (2) a cause of action, and (3) the right to obtain
243. Indeed, the courts are split on whether all kinds of actual damages can be
recovered in a common-law fraud action. A number of jurisdictions preclude a
plaintiff from recovering for emotional distress damages in a fraud action. See Kilduff
v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 484 (Conn. 1991) (noting split of authority).
244. Or, as one student commentator has put it in describing the kind of
discriminatory advertising suit at issue in Hary Macklowe, "[w]hile some courts have
cautioned that expansive standing under [Section 3604(c)] will lead to frivolous
lawsuits, the [FHA's] goals of nondiscrimination and integration clearly override such
concerns." See Steams, supra note 181, at 1222. Perhaps they do, but I would have
preferred Congress to say so somewhat more explicitly before standing was granted
to an entire newspaper reading population.
245. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 278; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 205. For
example, I have previously written how a proscription against using predominantly
white models in real estate advertisements might lead some owners of luxury hi-rise
buildings to publish advertisements that may be misleading. Rosman, supra note 176,
at 334-35. If standing were limited to individuals actually harmed, a comparison of
the number of lawsuits alleging discriminatory advertising with the number alleging
fraudulent advertising might give both potential defendants and policymakers some
idea of which problem was more serious for those most intimately involved. With
standing for discriminatory advertising as broad as the court found it in Harry
Macklowe, the results are going to be skewed.
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relief.246 But if it makes no sense to say that a plaintiff has standing but no
cause of action, then it is equally senseless to say that "[a] plaintiff may have
a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at all." '47 For what
does he have a cause of action?
The recent decision of the D.C. Circuit in Fair Employment Council of
Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.248 makes this point quite
well. In BMC Marketing, the individual plaintiffs were employment
discrimination testers who, much like the individual black plaintiff in Havens
Realty, alleged that they sought referrals from the defendant employment
agency, and that they had not been provided with employment opportunities
because of their race.249 They sued under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title
VII" The defendant employment agency moved to dismiss the claim for
"want of standing."'
51
With respect to the Title VII claim, the court took the opportunity of a
so-called "standing" motion to consider whether plaintiffs could obtain any
relief specified under that statute. z 2 The court concluded that (1) the
individual plaintiffs were not entitled to damages because the acts in question
246. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979) ("standing is a question
of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create an Art. III case
or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limitations on federal-court
jurisdiction ...; cause of action is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a
member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the
power of the court; and relief is a question of the various remedies a federal court may
make available" (emphasis in original)). The Court reiterated the distinction between
an implied cause of action, and what that cause of action permits in the way of
remedy, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1992).
247. Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18. The example that the Court gave-a plaintiff
that sues for declaratory or injunctive relief but does not meet the conditions for such
equitable remedies, id.,--is just the kind of situation that was present in Fair
Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1994). See discussion infra notes 248-254. See also Schwemm, supra note
1, at 8 (under Supreme Court precedents, "the term 'standing' may be used to describe
two distinct concepts: (1) standing to sue, that is, standing to invoke the court's
jurisdiction; and (2) standing to make particular claims or arguments once it has been
determined that the suit has been brought by a proper party").
248. 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The analysis of the standing of the
organizational plaintiff is described in supra note 218.
249. Id In fact, the complaint alleged that the defendant employment agency
had refused to accept the application of one of the black employment testers. Id.
250. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1988) (prohibiting an employment
agency from "refus[ing] to refer for employment" because of an applicant's race).
251. BMC Marketing., 28 F.3d at 1270.
252. The Court specifically refused to determine whether the individual plaintiffs
lacked "any cause of action under § 2000e-2(b)." Id. at 1272 n.1.
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occurred prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991;"s and
(2) the individual plaintiffs "lacked standing" to seek injunctive or declaratory
relief because they were not threatened with any future illegality.254
As already noted, the courts have universally held (based upon the
Supreme Court's citation in Trafficante of Hackett v. McGuire Bros.)" s that
standing under Title VII extends to the full extent of Article III. But how
much sense does it make to say that a statute that simply cannot remedy
certain injuries reaches the constitutional limits? 6 I would conclude just
the opposite, that the limited set of remedies available under a statute
(meaning not all injuries can be remedied) suggests that those injured should
be injured in a particular way. Suppose, for example, that a court concluded
that the provision in the ADEA prohibiting discriminatory advertising, like the
analogous provision in the FHA, grants standing to anyone who sees a
discriminatory advertisement. 7 Because the ADEA is generally interpreted
as precluding compensatory damage claims,258 the claims of those not
actually interested in the employment will revolve around whether the
defendants will publish such advertisements in the future, an inherently diffi-
253. Id. at 1272.
254. Id. at 1272-74. Professor Winter anticipated the result in BMC Marketing.
Winter, supra note 21, at 1489 (under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95
(1983), "the tester will not have standing to obtain an injunction.. .).
Curiously, in determining that the organizational plaintiff did have standing and
a cause of action under Title VII, the court in BMC Marketing did not address whether
there was any likelihood of future harm to the organization, but simply relied upon the
"drain of resources" injury that already had been inflicted. As noted earlier, see supra
note 218, the court in BMC Marketing rejected the self-inflicted "drain of resources"
injury espoused in other circuits, but held that, at the pleading stage, the organization
had properly pled a direct impairment of their programs.
255. 445 F.2d 442 (3d Cir. 1971). See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 209 (citing Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3d Cir.
1971).
256. One could consider the problem identified in the text as a "redressability"
problem under Article III, that is, if the statute does not permit the relief requested,
then the claim is not "redressable" and does not meet Article III minima. Compare
Sunstein, supra note 9, at 209 ("we should think of redressability as a crude device for
determining whether Congress intended to confer a cause of action"). Unfortunately,
the Court has indicated that "redressability" is determined not by the relief available
but rather by the relief requested. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984)
(redressability addresses causal connection between "the alleged injury and the judicial
relief requested' (emphasis added)). If this is true, then plaintiffs who ask for the
unattainable are said to have standing, but to lack a valid legal claim for the relief
requested.
257. See discussion supra in text accompanying notes 190-194.
258. E.g., Espinueva v. Garrett, 895 F.2d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir. 1990).
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cult factual issue. The absence of a damage remedy for such plaintiffs should
militate in favor of allowing only those with an actual interest in the
employment to enforce the discriminatory advertising provision.
Similarly, it seems less likely that organizations promoting non-
discriminatory principles should have standing under the ADEA. If their past
injury is the typical "drain-of-resources" claim, their future injury would seem
to be preventable in most instances (by, for example, educating clients now
that the acts undertaken by the defendants are illegal, and thus precluding the
need for such expenditures in the future). Again, I do not suggest that this is
the only conclusion one can draw. I only suggest that a standing analysis
based upon an attempt to determine to whom Congress wanted to give a right
to sue should take a limited remedial scheme into account.
CONCLUSION
When any set of results seem conflicting, and distinctions appear
irrational, there is a natural tendency to look for a cause. Most academic
work on standing issues begins with the confusion in the constitutional law
cases and concludes that the guiding principal needed to restore rationality to
the area is to jettison a separate idea of "standing" and consider the issue
normally addressed in "standing" cases (i.e., is this the right plaintiff?) as part
of the merits of the claim, just as is done in third-party contract cases.
This article began with a different set of confused results, all of which
resulted after beginning with the premise that "standing" issues should turn on
the substantive claim being made. When the courts hold that everyone who
reads a newspaper has standing, or that groups which independently spend
their own funds in an effort to ferret out wrongdoing have been "injured,"
however, one is prompted to continue looking for additional sources of
confusion. This article has analyzed such inconsistencies (and some leaps in
logic), and has tried to understand their source. While it is easy to attribute
unusual results to slipshod judicial analysis, I have tried to suggest here that
something more may be going on. Specifically, I believe that by focusing on
the statutory interpretation issues-viz., whether Congress has repealed the
prudential rules of standing or whether it has statutorily created a "right" the
violation of which constitutes a legal injury-the Court has obscured the
primary question that should be the focus in standing cases: Did those who
created the law want someone like this plaintiff enforcing the statutory
obligations against someone like this defendant? Starting with that question,
and using the traditional presumptions of our jurisprudence, I believe, will
begin to provide us with a more sensible law of standing under the Fair
Housing Act and elsewhere.
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